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ABSTRACT	  	   This	  thesis	  discusses	  the	  issues	  of	  public	  culture,	  identities,	  and	  law	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  (1644-­‐1911).	  It	  goes	  beyond	  current	  scholarship	  which	  focuses	  on	  official	  and	  elite	  narratives	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  and	  tries	  to	  explore	  the	  public	  culture	  in	  which	  ordinary	  Chinese	  Muslims	  participated	  in	  their	  daily	  life	  during	  the	  Qing	  period.	  	  
Mainly	  based	  on	  steles	  erected	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  mosques,	  shrines,	  cemeteries,	  and	  other	  public	  places	  where	  they	  usually	  gathered,	  this	  thesis	  tries	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  following	  questions:	  Did	  Chinese	  Muslims	  live	  as	  a	  distinctive	  community	  in	  the	  Qing	  society?	  How	  were	  Chinese	  Muslims	  organized	  in	  society?	  How	  were	  those	  organizations	  managed	  and	  regulated?	  How	  did	  they	  identify	  themselves	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire?	  And	  what	  was	  the	  role	  of	  religious	  distinction	  in	  their	  identity?	  
	  This	  thesis	  reveals	  that,	  for	  various	  practical	  purposes,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  formed	  different	  publics	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  common	  bonds	  they	  could	  invoke,	  including	  native	  place,	  religion,	  occupation,	  gender,	  and	  lineage,	  etc.	  The	  religious	  identity	  and	  religious	  publics	  represented	  only	  part	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  To	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  their	  religious	  identity	  was	  parallel	  to	  their	  regional,	  familial,	  and	  occupational	  identities.	  It	  could	  be	  abandoned	  when	  it	  jeopardized	  their	  economic	  interests.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  invoked	  to	  form	  a	  public	  when	  it	  was	  beneficial	  to	  the	  common	  interests	  of	  certain	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  In	  addition,	  publics	  often	  overlapped,	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  felt	  comfortable	  to	  adopt	  multiple	  identities	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  For	  example,	  a	  jiaofang	  (a	  group	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  affiliated	  to	  the	  same	  mosque)	  was	  a	  religious	  organization,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  local	  community	  where	  the	  government	  often	  relied	  on	  the	  locally	  based	  gentry	  to	  provide	  semi-­‐official	  governance.	  Therefore,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	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Chapter	  1 Introduction	  
The	  history	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  field	  of	  research.	  In	  terms	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  current	  scholarship	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  the	  official	  narrative	  of	  their	  history,	  including	  discussion	  on	  major	  rebellions	  led	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  their	  relationship	  with	  Han	  Chinese,	  and	  the	  Qing	  state’s	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  policies.	  Some	  scholars	  also	  touch	  upon	  the	  Islamic	  revival	  among	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati,	  which	  started	  in	  the	  late	  Ming	  and	  early	  Qing	  period	  (around	  the	  16th-­‐17th	  centuries).	  Their	  discussion	  mainly	  centers	  on	  the	  intellectual	  world	  of	  elite	  Chinese	  Muslims.1	  	  
This	  thesis	  goes	  beyond	  official	  and	  elite	  narratives	  and	  discusses	  the	  “public	  culture”	  in	  which	  every	  ordinary	  Chinese	  Muslim	  participated	  in	  their	  daily	  life.	  The	  major	  primary	  sources	  are	  steles	  erected	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  mosques,	  Islamic	  shrines,	  cemeteries,	  and	  other	  public	  places	  where	  they	  usually	  gathered	  during	  the	  Qing	  period.	  Contents	  of	  those	  steles	  include	  records	  of	  newly	  built	  or	  renovated	  mosques,	  records	  of	  donation	  to	  mosques	  by	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  the	  gentry,	  and	  officials,	  public	  agreements	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  groups,	  which	  included	  fund-­‐raising	  organizations,	  lineages,	  and	  merchant	  associations.	  There	  are	  also	  steles	  on	  which	  inscribed	  public	  notices	  concerning	  economic	  conflicts	  within	  Chinese	  Muslim	  groups.	  Those	  steles	  provide	  important	  information	  about	  how	  Chinese	  Muslims	  organized	  themselves,	  how	  they	  managed	  themselves,	  and	  how	  they	  solved	  intra-­‐group	  conflicts	  during	  the	  Qing	  period.	  There	  have	  been	  collections	  of	  those	  steles	  published	  in	  the	  People’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  current	  scholarship,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  following	  section	  -­‐-­‐-­‐“Current	  Scholarship	  on	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing.”	  
	   2	  
Republic	  of	  China	  but	  no	  scholarship	  has	  made	  extensive	  use	  of	  them	  for	  historical	  research	  on	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  Incidents	  recorded	  in	  local	  gazetteers	  and	  Shen	  Bao	  during	  the	  Qing	  period	  will	  also	  be	  referred	  to	  from	  time	  to	  time.2	  	  
Through	  examination	  of	  everyday	  life	  and	  the	  “public	  culture”	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  this	  thesis	  tries	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  following	  questions:	  Did	  Chinese	  Muslims	  live	  as	  a	  distinctive	  community	  in	  the	  Qing	  society?	  How	  were	  Chinese	  Muslims	  organized	  in	  society?	  How	  were	  those	  organizations	  managed	  and	  regulated?	  How	  did	  they	  identify	  themselves	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire?	  And	  what	  was	  the	  role	  of	  religious	  distinction	  in	  their	  identity?	  	  
This	  thesis	  reveals	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  formed	  various	  “publics,”	  often	  for	  practical	  purposes	  such	  as	  to	  compete	  more	  effectively	  for	  social	  resources.	  They	  invoked	  different	  common	  bonds	  /identities	  to	  form	  those	  publics	  including	  native	  place,	  religion,	  occupation,	  gender,	  and	  lineages,	  etc.	  Religious	  identity	  and	  religious	  publics	  represented	  only	  part	  of	  the	  quotidian	  life	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  To	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  their	  religious	  identity	  was	  parallel	  to	  their	  regional,	  familial,	  and	  occupational	  identities.	  It	  could	  be	  abandoned	  when	  it	  jeopardized	  their	  economic	  interests.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  invoked	  to	  form	  a	  public	  when	  it	  was	  beneficial	  to	  the	  common	  interests	  of	  certain	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  In	  addition,	  publics	  often	  overlapped	  as	  Chinese	  Muslims	  felt	  comfortable	  to	  adopt	  multiple	  identities	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  For	  example,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Shen	  Bao	  (申报)	  was	  a	  commercial	  Chinese	  newspaper	  founded	  by	  a	  British	  businessman	  in	  Shanghai,	  China.	  It	  was	  published	  from	  April	  30,	  1872	  to	  May	  27,	  1949.	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jiaofang3	  was	  a	  religious	  organization,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  local	  community	  where	  the	  government	  often	  relied	  on	  the	  locally	  based	  gentry	  to	  provide	  semi-­‐official	  governance.	  Therefore,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  participated	  actively	  in	  religious	  activities	  of	  jiaofang	  as	  Muslims,	  and	  meanwhile,	  adopted	  the	  identity	  as	  gentry,	  cooperated	  with	  the	  government,	  and	  managed	  local	  Islamic	  jiaofang,	  just	  like	  non-­‐Muslim	  Han	  Chinese	  gentry	  managing	  their	  local	  communities.	  	  
This	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  six	  chapters.	  The	  first	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  current	  scholarship,	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “Chinese	  Muslims.”	  The	  second	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  culture	  and	  the	  two	  religious	  publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  The	  third	  chapter	  reveals	  how	  various	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  adjusted	  to	  or	  resisted	  government	  policies.	  Chapter	  4	  examines	  how	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  religious	  publics	  were	  managed	  and	  regulated	  from	  two	  perspectives	  -­‐-­‐-­‐leadership	  and	  conflict	  settlement.	  Chapter	  5	  unveils	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  overlapping	  publics	  and	  multiple	  identities.	  The	  last	  Chapter	  will	  be	  the	  conclusion,	  summarizing	  how	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  invoked	  various	  identities	  and	  participated	  in	  overlapping	  publics.	  	  
	  
Current	  Scholarship	  on	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  
Scholars	  of	  the	  New	  Qing	  History	  such	  as	  Pamela	  Kyle	  Crossley	  and	  Mark	  Elliot	  have	  opened	  a	  new	  angle	  to	  look	  at	  the	  Qing	  state	  and	  society.	  They	  question	  the	  traditional	  paradigm	  of	  acculturation	  to	  Chinese	  civilization	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Jiaofang	  教坊	  refers	  to	  publics	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  affiliated	  to	  the	  same	  mosques.	  For	  detailed	  explanation,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  section	  -­‐-­‐-­‐“Local	  Mosques	  and	  Jiaofang”	  -­‐-­‐-­‐in	  Chapter	  2.	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bring	  attention	  to	  the	  distinctive	  ways	  of	  living	  of	  other	  ethnic	  groups	  other	  than	  Han	  Chinese	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire.4	  In	  his	  book	  examining	  Qing’s	  governance	  in	  Xinjiang	  (East	  Turkestan)	  where	  local	  residents	  were	  mainly	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims,	  corresponding	  to	  Elliot’s	  argument	  that	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  ruled	  in	  a	  “cosmopolitan”	  and	  “ethnic”	  mode,5	  Millward	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  new	  vision	  of	  the	  Empire	  proposed	  by	  Emperor	  Qianlong	  in	  the	  mid-­‐18th	  century	  when	  the	  Qing	  had	  far	  expanded	  into	  Mongolia,	  Tibet,	  East	  Turkestan,	  and	  the	  southwestern	  borderland.	  The	  vision	  was	  called	  A	  Great	  Unity	  (datong	  ⼤大同)	  of	  five	  domains	  -­‐-­‐-­‐Manchus,	  Mongols,	  Han	  Chinese,	  Tibetans,	  and	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims.	  Millward	  therefore	  argues	  against	  the	  classic	  Chinese	  World	  Order	  formulated	  by	  John	  King	  Fairbank	  with	  China	  in	  the	  center	  of	  a	  series	  of	  concentric	  rings	  of	  other	  ethnic	  groups,	  and	  the	  more	  acculturated	  to	  Chinese	  civilization,	  the	  closer	  an	  ethnic	  group	  was	  to	  the	  center.	  Instead,	  Millward	  proposes	  a	  new	  “map”	  for	  the	  Qing’s	  ideal	  polyethnic	  structure	  of	  ruling	  in	  which	  the	  Qing	  Imperial	  House	  was	  surrounded	  by	  those	  five	  main	  ethnic	  groups.	  Each	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  Qing	  state	  but	  remained	  separate	  from	  one	  another.6	  Millward’s	  map	  reflects	  the	  parallel	  relationship	  among	  the	  five	  main	  ethnics	  and	  the	  pluralistic	  vision	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  
Chinese	  Muslims,	  as	  a	  group	  of	  Muslims	  without	  a	  territory	  and	  a	  language	  distinct	  from	  Han	  Chinese,	  were	  not	  among	  the	  five	  major	  ethnics,	  and	  had	  complicated	  connections	  with	  both	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims	  and	  Han	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  Pamela	  K.	  Crossley,	  A	  Translucent	  Mirror:	  History	  and	  Identity	  in	  Qing	  Imperial	  Ideology	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999);	  and	  Mark	  Elliot,	  The	  Manchu	  Way:	  The	  Eight	  
Banners	  and	  Ethnic	  Identity	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  China	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  5	  Elliot,	  The	  Manchu	  Way,	  4.	  6	  James	  A.	  Millward,	  Beyond	  the	  Pass:	  Economy,	  Ethnicity,	  and	  Empire	  in	  Qing	  Central	  Asia,	  1759-­‐
1864	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  197-­‐203.	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Chinese.	  Even	  the	  Qing	  State	  had	  difficulty	  in	  identifying	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  a	  unified	  way.	  In	  one	  of	  his	  essays	  discussing	  the	  history	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  Lipman	  examines	  Qing’s	  legal	  discourse	  concerning	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  and	  notices	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  different	  from	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims	  in	  Xinjiang	  who	  were	  governed	  by	  legal	  pluralism,	  were	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  regular	  civil	  officials	  just	  like	  Han	  Chinese,	  which	  is	  described	  by	  Lipman	  as	  “an	  administrative	  decision	  that	  emphasized	  their	  Chineseness.”	  Nonetheless,	  as	  Lipman	  points	  out,	  their	  “non-­‐Chinese”	  characteristics	  -­‐-­‐-­‐basically	  their	  identity	  as	  Muslims	  -­‐-­‐-­‐was	  often	  invoked	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  their	  crimes	  especially	  when	  they	  attacked	  Han	  Chinese	  or	  participated	  in	  uprising.	  Lipman	  discusses	  how	  specific	  clauses	  regulating	  only	  Chinese	  Muslims	  started	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  Qing	  Code	  since	  the	  late	  18th	  century.	  In	  those	  clauses,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  punished	  more	  severely	  than	  Han	  Chinese	  who	  committed	  the	  same	  crimes.	  Those	  discriminative	  clauses	  mainly	  appeared	  in	  sections	  of	  theft,	  robbery	  and	  violent	  assaults	  in	  which	  the	  Qing	  government	  believed	  “fierce	  and	  brutal”	  people	  like	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  easier	  to	  get	  involved.7	  Lipman’s	  findings	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  despite	  its	  paradigm	  of	  universality	  and	  polyethinicity,	  the	  Qing	  state	  at	  times	  still	  invoked	  “the	  rhetoric	  of	  civilization”	  which	  presumed	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  those	  who	  were	  civilized	  and	  those	  who	  were	  uncivilized	  barbarians.	  When	  discussing	  Chinese	  Muslim	  rebellions	  in	  northwestern	  China,	  Lipman	  reveals	  how	  the	  Qing	  central	  government	  and	  local	  officials’	  problematic	  intervention	  in	  internal	  conflicts	  between	  different	  Islamic	  sects	  in	  northwestern	  China	  gave	  rise	  to	  large-­‐scale	  rebellions	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  against	  the	  Qing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Jonathan	  N.	  Lipman,	  “A	  fierce	  and	  brutal	  people:	  On	  Islam	  and	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  Law,”	  in	  
Empire	  at	  the	  Margins:	  Culture,	  Ethnicity,	  and	  Frontier	  in	  Early	  Modern	  China,	  ed.	  Pamela	  Kyle	  Crossley,	  et	  al.	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2006),	  83-­‐112.	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state.	  When	  those	  conflicts	  were	  brought	  to	  local	  governments	  for	  settlement,	  officials	  usually	  took	  the	  side	  with	  the	  well-­‐established	  sect	  and	  therefore	  appeared	  more	  familiar	  and	  more	  “civilized.”8	  	  
Though	  a	  pioneering	  study	  in	  the	  field	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing,	  Lipman’s	  research	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  the	  official	  narrative	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  history	  and	  their	  identities	  imposed	  by	  the	  state.	  Later	  scholars	  started	  to	  turn	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  	  
In	  his	  book	  on	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims	  in	  Xinjiang,	  Millward	  already	  unveils	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  self-­‐perceived	  identities	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  Millward	  notices	  that	  after	  the	  Qing’s	  conquest	  of	  Xinjiang,	  many	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  went	  there	  from	  northwestern	  provinces	  such	  as	  Gansu	  and	  Shaanxi	  to	  seek	  lucrative	  opportunities.	  In	  a	  small	  section	  where	  Millward	  discusses	  those	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  in	  Xinjiang,	  he	  states	  that	  they	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  their	  somehow	  double	  identities	  as	  both	  Chinese	  and	  Muslims.	  As	  we	  may	  expect,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  in	  Xinjiang	  often	  worked	  as	  commercial	  mediators	  between	  Han	  Chinese	  merchants	  and	  local	  East	  Turkestani	  Muslims.	  Millward	  also	  provided	  an	  example	  where	  a	  Chinese	  Muslim	  Green	  Standard	  soldier,	  who	  was	  stationed	  in	  Xinjiang	  after	  the	  conquest,	  disguised	  himself	  as	  a	  foreign	  Muslim	  merchant	  from	  Central	  Asia,	  trying	  to	  escape	  west	  out	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  Millward	  argues	  that	  this	  would	  not	  be	  a	  single	  case	  since	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  the	  Qing	  state	  and	  officials	  were	  	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  the	  circumstances	  of	  “desinicization”	  where	  Chinese	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Jonathan	  N.	  Lipman,	  “Ethnic	  Violence	  in	  Modern	  China:	  Hans	  and	  Huis	  in	  Gansu,	  1781-­‐1929,”	  in	  
Violence	  in	  China:	  Essays	  in	  Culture	  and	  Counterculture,	  ed.	  Jonathan	  N.	  Lipman,	  et	  al.	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1990),	  65-­‐86.	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Muslim	  merchants	  in	  Xinjiang	  married	  local	  Turkestani	  women	  and	  even	  cut	  their	  queues.	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  started	  to	  be	  closely	  scrutinized	  in	  official	  checkpoints	  between	  Xinjiang	  and	  China	  proper9	  and	  their	  intermarriage	  with	  local	  women	  in	  Xinjiang	  was	  prohibited.10	  	  
Studies	  by	  Sachiko	  Muraka	  and	  Zvi	  Ben-­‐Dor	  Benite	  focus	  on	  the	  Islamic	  revival	  among	  Chinese	  Muslims	  starting	  from	  the	  late	  16th	  and	  early	  17th	  centuries.	  During	  that	  period,	  large	  quantity	  of	  Chinese	  translations	  of	  Islamic	  classics	  and	  Sufi	  texts	  were	  produced	  and	  widely	  circulated	  in	  China	  proper.	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati	  also	  wrote	  and	  published	  many	  Islamic	  research	  works	  in	  Chinese	  language.	  Those	  works	  were	  called	  the	  Han	  Kitab	  -­‐-­‐-­‐a	  name	  combining	  the	  Chinese	  word	  for	  “Chinese”	  and	  the	  Arabic	  word	  for	  “book.”	  Meanwhile,	  an	  Islamic	  educational	  network	  also	  started	  to	  bourgeon	  in	  China	  proper.	  Whereas	  Muraka’s	  book	  examines	  only	  two	  of	  the	  representative	  works	  of	  the	  Han	  Kitab	  in	  Qing	  China	  and	  analyzes	  them	  purely	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  intellectual	  history,11	  Benite’s	  book	  reveals	  the	  issue	  of	  identity	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati	  through	  examination	  of	  the	  Han	  Kitab	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Muslim	  educational	  network.	  He	  argues	  that	  through	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  Han	  Kitab,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati	  “created,	  shaped,	  and	  expressed”	  their	  identity.	  He	  also	  argues	  that	  “Chineseness”	  and	  “Muslimness”	  were	  equally	  important	  for	  and	  “simultaneously”	  present	  in	  the	  identity	  of	  those	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati,	  though	  there	  was	  still	  a	  strong	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  “China	  proper”	  is	  used	  by	  New	  Qing	  historians	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  area	  where	  Han	  Chinese	  mainly	  lived	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  10	  Millward,	  Beyond	  the	  Pass,	  168-­‐175.	  11	  Sakicho	  Murata,	  Chinese	  Gleams	  of	  Sufi	  Light:	  Wang	  tai-­‐yü’s	  “Great	  Learning	  of	  the	  Pure	  and	  
Real”	  and	  Liu	  Chih’s	  “Displaying	  the	  Concealment	  of	  the	  Real	  Realm”	  (New	  York:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2000).	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feeling	  of	  diaspora	  expressed	  in	  their	  works.12	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  since	  most	  of	  those	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati	  settled	  in	  southeastern	  China,	  Benite’s	  work	  only	  unveils	  the	  identity	  problem	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  a	  specific	  social	  class	  in	  a	  small	  area	  of	  Qing	  China.	  	  
This	  thesis	  goes	  beyond	  official	  and	  elite	  narratives	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  seeking	  to	  reveal	  the	  everyday	  public	  life	  of	  ordinary	  Chinese	  Muslims	  and	  their	  subjective	  identities.	  It	  also	  expands	  our	  knowledge	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  from	  Islamic	  sects	  and	  Sufi	  orders	  in	  the	  northwest	  and	  those	  literati	  in	  the	  southeast	  where	  historical	  records	  are	  comparatively	  abundant.	  Through	  examination	  of	  steles	  erected	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  all	  over	  China	  proper,	  this	  thesis	  will	  show	  how	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  various	  regions	  of	  Qing	  China	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  such	  as	  Sichuan,	  Guangxi,	  Hebei,	  and	  Hunan	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  organized	  themselves	  and	  formed	  social	  groups.	  It	  will	  also	  compose	  a	  preliminary	  picture	  of	  regional	  differences	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  public	  culture	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  This	  thesis	  also	  examines	  how	  Chinese	  Muslims	  responded	  to	  and	  coped	  with	  Qing’s	  ethnic	  policies	  in	  their	  actual	  daily	  life.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  through	  examination	  of	  the	  public	  culture	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  this	  research	  is	  able	  to	  reveal	  what	  kind	  of	  identities	  Chinese	  Muslims	  tended	  to	  invoke	  when	  participating	  in	  various	  social	  groups	  and	  what	  rules	  or	  laws	  they	  chose	  to	  protect	  their	  interests.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Zvi	  Ben-­‐Dor	  Benite,	  The	  Dao	  of	  Muhammad:	  A	  Cultural	  History	  of	  Muslims	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  
China	  (Cambridge,	  Massachusetts	  and	  London:	  Harvard	  University	  Asia	  Center,	  2005).	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The	  Problem	  of	  Naming	  -­‐-­‐-­‐Hui	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  
In	  historical	  records	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Muslims	  were	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  hui	  回,	  or	  huihui	  回回,	  a	  name	  which	  was	  thought	  to	  have	  been	  developed	  from	  huihe	  回纥	  adopted	  during	  the	  Tang	  Dynasty	  (618-­‐907)	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Uighur	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  an	  ethnic	  group	  from	  Central	  Asia	  who	  were	  adherents	  of	  Islam.	  Islam,	  correspondingly,	  was	  called	  huijiao	  回教	  (the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Hui	  people)	  in	  the	  Qing.	  The	  connotation	  of	  the	  name	  hui	  is	  not	  only	  religious,	  though.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  generally	  believed	  themselves	  to	  be	  descendants	  of	  the	  first	  group	  of	  Muslims	  who	  started	  to	  settle	  down	  in	  China	  since	  the	  7th	  century.	  They	  thought	  they	  possessed	  a	  common	  root	  (ben	  本)	  which	  lay	  to	  the	  west	  of	  China.	  	  	  
The	  Hui	  were	  widely	  distributed	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  and	  could	  differ	  greatly	  from	  one	  community	  to	  another.	  In	  the	  northwestern	  part	  of	  the	  Empire	  -­‐-­‐-­‐Xinjiang,	  which	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Qing	  in	  1759,	  there	  mainly	  lived	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims,	  including	  Uighurs,	  Uzbeks,	  and	  Kazakhs,	  etc.	  Due	  to	  their	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  uniqueness,	  those	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims	  belonged	  to	  one	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  five	  major	  cultural	  “domains”	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  which	  also	  included	  Manchus,	  Mongols,	  Han	  Chinese,	  and	  Tibetans.	  Before	  the	  incorporation	  of	  East	  Turkestan	  into	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  those	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims	  were	  referred	  to	  in	  Qing	  historical	  records	  as	  huizi	  回⼦子,	  a	  somehow	  derogatory	  version	  of	  hui.	  After	  their	  incorporation,	  they	  started	  to	  be	  called	  huimin	  回民.	  The	  term	  min 民	  (people,	  subjects)	  represented	  their	  legal	  category	  as	  the	  registered	  subjects	  of	  the	  Qing.	  Like	  the	  Mongols	  and	  the	  Tibetans,	  Muslims	  in	  Xinjiang	  were	  governed	  under	  the	  principle	  of	  legal	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pluralism.	  Legal	  affairs	  of	  local	  Muslims	  were	  dealt	  with	  under	  the	  Islamic	  law	  (shari’a)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐which	  was	  administered	  by	  local	  noblemen	  (begs;	  Chinese:	  伯克)	  and	  religious	  leaders	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  and	  a	  set	  of	  Qing	  regulations	  specially	  designed	  for	  Xinjiang	  -­‐-­‐-­‐Qinding	  huijiang	  zeli	  钦定回疆则例	  (Imperial	  Regulations	  of	  Xinjiang).	  	  
Another	  distinctive	  Hui	  group	  was	  the	  Salar	  Hui	  (撒拉尔回/撒拉回).	  They	  were	  a	  comparatively	  small	  group	  of	  Muslims	  living	  in	  the	  southwestern	  part	  of	  Gansu	  -­‐-­‐-­‐the	  middle	  area	  between	  Tibet	  and	  China	  proper.	  The	  area	  was	  the	  west	  borderland	  of	  the	  Ming	  Empire	  (1368-­‐1644)	  under	  which	  the	  Salar	  Hui	  was	  considered	  as	  fan 番	  (barbarians,	  non-­‐subjects)	  rather	  than	  min	  民	  (subjects).	  The	  Qing	  kept	  their	  legal	  status	  as	  fan,	  who	  were	  ruled	  by	  tusi	  ⼟土司	  (local	  leaders)	  and	  enjoyed	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  autonomy,	  which	  remained	  until	  the	  late	  18th	  century.	  “Fan”	  only	  indicated	  a	  legal	  category.	  It	  did	  not	  hinder	  their	  connections	  to	  Chinese	  Muslims	  living	  in	  proximity.	  Indeed	  till	  the	  Qing,	  the	  area	  of	  Salar	  Hui	  had	  already	  been	  inhabited	  by	  large	  numbers	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  Many	  Salar	  Hui	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Gansu	  belonged	  to	  the	  same	  Islamic	  sects.	  
Apart	  from	  Muslims	  in	  Xinjiang,	  another	  big	  group	  of	  huimin	  回民	  (Hui	  subjects)	  was	  Muslims	  living	  in	  China	  proper.	  Those	  were	  what	  this	  thesis	  refers	  to	  as	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  Since	  the	  mid	  Ming,	  Muslims	  living	  in	  China	  proper	  in	  proximity	  with	  their	  Han	  Chinese	  neighbors	  began	  to	  be	  assimilated	  to	  local	  Chinese	  ways.	  They	  gradually	  lost	  their	  original	  languages	  of	  Persian,	  Arabic,	  or	  other	  Turkic	  languages	  and	  spoke	  only	  Chinese.	  They	  also	  widely	  adopted	  Chinese	  customs	  and	  became	  very	  difficult	  to	  be	  differentiated	  from	  Han	  Chinese.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  were	  still	  different	  from	  Han	  Chinese	  in	  terms	  of	  religion	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and	  related	  rituals.	  This	  caused	  some	  ambiguity	  for	  the	  Qing	  state	  to	  categorize	  and	  name	  them.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  legal	  affairs	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  dealt	  with	  by	  regular	  civil	  officials	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  those	  of	  Han	  Chinese.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  and	  Muslims	  in	  Xinjiang	  were	  both	  called	  huimin	  and	  there	  were	  often	  no	  ways	  to	  differentiate	  them	  in	  written	  documents	  unless	  other	  information	  was	  provided.	  The	  only	  exception	  existed	  in	  Xinjiang	  in	  cases	  where	  local	  Turkestani	  Muslims,	  as	  well	  as	  sojourning	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  all	  involved.	  Under	  those	  circumstances,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  called	  neidi	  huimin	  内地回民	  (Hui	  subjects	  from	  the	  inner	  land)	  or	  hanhui	  汉回	  (an	  invented	  compound	  consisting	  of	  names	  for	  both	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  the	  Hui).	  The	  name	  hanhui	  reveals	  the	  confusion	  which	  the	  Qing	  state	  had	  towards	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  who	  seemed	  to	  lie	  somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  two	  cultural	  “domains”	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  Turkic-­‐speaking	  Muslims.	  	  
Problems	  with	  Chinese	  Muslims	  include	  not	  only	  their	  confusing	  double	  categories	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  The	  picture	  was	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  minzu	  
民族	  (nationalities)	  paradigm	  adopted	  by	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  in	  modern	  times.	  Under	  the	  minzu	  scheme,	  Muslims	  in	  the	  PRC	  are	  divided	  into	  ten	  nationalities,	  among	  which	  nine	  are	  linguistically	  and	  territorially	  distinct	  such	  as	  the	  Uighur,	  Kazakhs,	  and	  Salars.	  Muslims,	  or	  descendants	  of	  Muslims,	  who	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  nine	  nationalities	  are	  categorized	  as	  another	  nationality	  -­‐-­‐-­‐
huizu	  回族	  (the	  Hui	  nationality)	  which	  includes	  basically	  Chinese	  Muslims	  defined	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  some	  other	  Muslims	  who	  lives	  in	  proximity	  to	  Tibetans	  and	  southwestern	  ethnic	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Bai	  and	  the	  Tai	  and	  speak	  their	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languages.13	  This	  modern	  appropriation	  of	  the	  name	  Hui	  confuses	  scholars.	  Additionally,	  the	  PRC	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  imposing	  its	  discourse	  of	  minzu	  paradigm.	  Chinese	  scholars,	  even	  including	  scholars	  of	  the	  Hui	  nationality,	  tend	  to	  essentialize	  the	  modern	  paradigm	  and	  make	  the	  anachronistic	  argument	  that	  
huizu	  has	  been	  presenting	  itself	  as	  a	  distinct	  ethnic	  group	  long	  since	  the	  Ming	  Dynasty.	  This	  thesis	  indeed	  provides	  counter-­‐evidence	  to	  that	  argument.	  
Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  widely	  distributed	  in	  China	  proper	  in	  the	  Qing	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  in	  Gansu	  and	  Shaanxi	  in	  the	  northwest,	  in	  Yunnan	  in	  the	  southwest,	  in	  Shandong	  in	  the	  East,	  and	  in	  Fujian	  in	  the	  southeast,	  etc.	  Among	  those	  communities,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  northwestern	  China	  were	  the	  most	  distinctive	  due	  to	  their	  proximity	  to	  Central	  Asia.	  They	  showed	  relatively	  strong	  Islamic	  inclination	  during	  the	  Qing	  and	  had	  a	  unique	  way	  of	  organization	  -­‐-­‐-­‐menhuan	  门宦,	  which	  was	  a	  Chinese	  invention	  combining	  characteristics	  of	  Sufi	  orders	  and	  Chinese	  lineages.	  They	  have	  been	  studied	  in	  detail	  by	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  and	  will	  not	  be	  a	  focus	  of	  this	  research.14	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  ethnic	  invention	  of	  huizu	  in	  the	  PRC,	  see	  Dru	  C.	  Gladney,	  Muslim	  
Chinese:	  Ethnic	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  (Cambridge,	  Massachusetts:	  Council	  on	  East	  Asian	  Studies,	  Harvard	  University,	  1991).	  	  14	  For	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  and	  menhuan	  in	  northwestern	  China,	  see	  Jonathan	  N,	  Lipman,	  Familiar	  Strangers:	  A	  History	  of	  Muslims	  in	  Northwest	  China	  (Seattle	  and	  London:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1997);	  and	  Ma	  Tong	  马通,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Chinese	  
Islamic	  sects	  and	  the	  Institution	  of	  Menhuan	  (zhongguo	  yisilan	  jiaopai	  yu	  menhuan	  zhidu	  shilue	  中
国伊斯兰教派与门宦制度史略)	  (Ningxia:	  People’s	  Publishing	  House	  of	  Ningxia,	  1983).	  
	   13	  
Chapter	  2	  Religious	  Identity	  and	  Religious	  Publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  
Public	  Culture	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  
Historians	  of	  late	  imperial	  China	  have	  generally	  noticed	  the	  trends	  of	  “commercialization,	  urbanization,	  and	  population	  growth”	  during	  that	  period.15	  Many	  scholars,	  through	  their	  study	  of	  social	  groups	  also	  point	  out	  how	  those	  trends	  drove	  people	  to	  organize	  themselves	  into	  various	  auto-­‐organizations	  so	  as	  to	  compete	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  resources	  more	  effectively.	  Most	  studies	  focus	  on	  Han	  Chinese	  gentry	  and	  merchants,	  who	  invoked	  different	  common	  bonds	  to	  form	  various	  auto-­‐organizations	  such	  as	  native-­‐place	  associations,	  occupational	  associations,	  and	  lineages.16	  Those	  groups	  worked	  together	  to	  safeguard	  the	  common	  interests	  of	  group	  members.	  In	  his	  paper	  on	  merchant	  auto-­‐organizations	  in	  the	  Qing,	  Kai-­‐wing	  Chow	  notices	  that,	  when	  recording	  their	  activities,	  members	  of	  those	  groups	  extensively	  adopted	  the	  word	  gong	  公	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Mary	  B.	  Rankin,	  “Observations	  on	  a	  Chinese	  Public	  Sphere,”	  Modern	  China,	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  2,	  Symposium:	  "Public	  Sphere"/"Civil	  Society"	  in	  China?	  Paradigmatic	  Issues	  in	  Chinese	  Studies,	  III	  (Apr.,	  1993),	  161.	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  social	  trends	  in	  late	  imperial	  China,	  see	  Chen	  Baoliang	  陈宝良,	  A	  History	  of	  Society	  and	  Life	  in	  the	  Ming	  Dynasty	  (mingdai	  shehui	  shenghuo	  
shi	  明代社会生活史)	  (Beijing:	  China	  Social	  Sciences	  Press,	  2004);	  and	  Fan	  Jinmin	  范金民,	  
Commercial	  Development	  of	  Jiangnan	  in	  Ming	  and	  Qing	  (mingqing	  jiangnan	  shangye	  de	  fazhan	  明
清江南商业的发展)	  (Nanjing:	  Nanjing	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  16	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  emergence	  and	  development	  of	  auto-­‐organizations	  in	  late	  imeperial	  China,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Ping-­‐ti	  Ho,	  A	  History	  of	  Huiguan	  in	  China	  (zhongguo	  huiguan	  shilun	  中国
会馆史论)	  (Taipei:	  Taiwan	  Students	  Press,	  1966).	  See	  also	  William	  T.	  Rowe,	  Hankow:	  Commerce	  
and	  Society	  in	  a	  Chinese	  City,	  1796-­‐1889	  (Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1984);	  and	  Bryna	  Goodman,	  Native	  Place,	  City,	  and	  Nation:	  Regional	  Networks	  and	  Identities	  in	  Shanghai,	  
1853-­‐1937	  (Berkeley	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  California:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1995),	  which	  examine	  auto-­‐organizations	  in	  two	  representative	  Chinese	  cities.	  See	  Tang	  Lixing	  唐力行,	  
Merchants	  and	  Culture	  -­‐-­‐-­‐A	  History	  of	  Huizhou	  Merchants	  and	  Lineage	  Society	  (shangren	  yu	  
wenhua	  de	  shuangchong	  bianzou	  -­‐-­‐-­‐huishang	  yu	  zongzu	  shehui	  de	  lishi	  商人与文化的双重变奏 —
—徽商与宗族社会的历史)	  (Wuhan:	  Huazhong	  University	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Press,	  1997);	  and	  Yongtao	  Du,	  “Locality,	  Identity,	  and	  Geography:	  Translocal	  Practices	  of	  Huizhou	  Merchants	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  China”	  (PhD	  diss.,	  University	  of	  Illinois	  at	  Urbana-­‐Champaign,	  2006),	  	  which	  look	  at	  the	  formation	  of	  merchant	  associations	  and	  lineages	  of	  Huizhou	  merchants.	  For	  more	  discussion	  on	  lineage	  formation	  in	  late	  imperial	  China,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Zheng	  Zhenman	  郑	  
振满,	  Lineages	  and	  Social	  Changes	  in	  Fujian	  during	  Ming	  and	  Qing	  (mingqing	  fujian	  jiazu	  zuzhi	  yu	  
shehui	  bianqian	  明清福建家族组织与社会变迁)	  (Changsha:	  Hunan	  Education	  Publishing	  House,	  1992).	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such	  compounds	  as	  gongsuo	  公所	  (public	  place/venue),	  gongchan	  公产	  (public/communal	  property),	  and	  gongtian	  公⽥田	  (public/communal	  land).	  	  It	  represented	  and	  contributed	  to	  “a	  drastic	  expansion”	  of	  the	  term	  gong	  “in	  its	  semantic	  scope	  in	  the	  Ming	  Qing	  period.”	  Gong,	  previously	  a	  term	  mainly	  referring	  to	  things	  related	  to	  the	  imperial	  government,	  was	  increasingly	  used	  to	  specially	  refer	  to	  “non-­‐government,	  communal,	  or	  collective	  practices”	  of	  social	  groups.17	  The	  new	  sense	  of	  gong	  reveals	  how	  Qing	  auto-­‐organizations	  worked	  to	  meet	  common	  needs	  and	  protect	  common	  interests	  of	  all	  group	  members.	  
There	  were	  some	  prominent	  characteristics	  of	  those	  auto-­‐organizations	  which	  embodied	  gong	  principles.	  Firstly,	  they	  were	  formed	  based	  on	  a	  constellation	  of	  common	  interests.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  people	  joined	  groups	  to	  better	  serve	  their	  private	  interests.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  groups	  were	  formed	  to	  promote	  communal	  interests	  of	  all	  members.	  Those	  organizations	  were	  thus	  where	  private	  and	  public	  interests	  entangled	  and	  interacted,	  and	  where	  private	  interests	  eventually	  were	  reconciled	  with	  public	  ones	  for	  the	  smooth	  operation	  of	  those	  groups.	  Secondly,	  to	  serve	  common	  interests	  and	  to	  facilitate	  collective	  actions,	  auto-­‐organizations	  needed	  specific	  means	  for	  transmitting	  information	  to	  ensure	  publicity	  and	  openness.	  Regarding	  Chinese	  Muslim	  groups	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis,	  they	  resorted	  to	  public	  steles,	  and	  later	  newspapers	  as	  well,	  for	  publicity	  of	  information.	  Thirdly,	  certain	  large	  auto-­‐organizations	  also	  represented	  their	  individual	  members	  and	  mediated	  between	  them	  and	  the	  state.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Kai-­‐wing	  Chow,	  “Printing	  from	  Stone:	  Steles,	  Law,	  and	  Public	  Culture	  in	  Qing	  China	  (1644-­‐1911)”	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  “Reading	  without	  Books:	  Experiences	  of	  Print	  in	  Everyday	  Life	  in	  Imperial	  China,	  Tang	  (618-­‐907)	  Through	  Qing	  (1644-­‐1911),”	  University	  of	  Illinois,	  Urbana-­‐Champaign,	  September	  26-­‐27,	  2014),	  3-­‐4.	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Many	  of	  them	  gained	  local	  authority	  due	  to	  their	  social	  resources,	  and	  could	  affect	  local	  laws	  and	  policies.	  	  
In	  describing	  those	  auto-­‐organizations	  and	  their	  activities,	  Chow	  uses	  the	  term	  “public	  culture.”18	  This	  thesis	  follows	  his	  usage.19	  The	  meanings	  of	  “public”	  properly	  correspond	  to	  the	  increasingly	  emphasized	  gong	  values	  (common	  interests,	  collective	  actions,	  and	  openness/publicity)	  in	  the	  Ming	  Qing	  period.	  
Gong	  and	  “public”	  also	  share	  the	  same	  semantic	  ambiguity	  -­‐-­‐-­‐sometimes	  referring	  to	  the	  government	  and	  sometimes	  the	  society	  exclusive	  of	  the	  government.20	  “Public”	  also	  connotes	  all	  individuals	  in	  a	  certain	  group	  without	  regard	  to	  limits	  of	  social	  categories	  or	  status.	  Indeed,	  this	  thesis	  discusses	  all	  individual	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  including	  both	  elites	  and	  common	  people,	  and	  including	  those	  in	  religious	  as	  well	  as	  secular	  professions.	  By	  using	  “culture,”	  this	  thesis	  mainly	  looks	  at	  the	  practices	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  groups	  in	  organizing	  themselves.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Chow,	  “Printing	  from	  Stone.”	  19	  The	  term	  “public	  culture”	  may	  remind	  the	  reader	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  “the	  public	  sphere”	  in	  the	  field	  of	  late	  imperial	  Chinese	  history.	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  debate.	  Haberma’s	  concept	  of	  “the	  public	  sphere”	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  specific	  situation	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  society	  in	  early	  modern	  Europe.	  Even	  though	  scholars	  on	  late	  imperial	  Chinese	  history	  such	  as	  William	  Rowe	  and	  Mary	  Backus	  Rankin	  find	  it	  reasonable	  to	  apply	  a	  broad	  version	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “the	  public	  sphere”	  -­‐-­‐-­‐any	  “intermediate	  arenas	  in	  which	  open,	  public	  initiatives	  are	  undertaken	  by	  both	  officials	  and	  the	  populace”-­‐-­‐-­‐to	  late	  imperial	  China,	  yet	  as	  scholars	  such	  as	  Philip	  Huang	  and	  Rowe	  himself	  question,	  when	  the	  concept	  is	  made	  that	  broad,	  its	  utility	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  becomes	  questionable.	  Hence,	  this	  thesis,	  though	  focusing	  on	  the	  public	  culture	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Qing	  China,	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  enter	  into	  this	  debate.	  It	  does	  not	  start	  from	  “the	  public	  sphere”	  drawn	  from	  Western	  contexts	  against	  which	  social	  changes	  in	  late	  imperial	  China	  are	  to	  be	  measured,	  but	  looks	  from	  a	  Chinese	  perspective,	  investigating	  situations	  in	  China,	  and	  wishing	  to	  represent	  how	  gong	  expanded	  its	  meanings	  along	  with	  social	  changes,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing.	  For	  more	  information	  about	  the	  debate,	  see	  articles	  from	  Modern	  China,	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  2,	  Symposium:	  "Public	  Sphere"/"Civil	  Society"	  in	  China?	  Paradigmatic	  Issues	  in	  Chinese	  Studies,	  III	  (Apr.,	  1993).	  20	  This	  similar	  sematic	  ambiguity	  between	  “public”	  and	  gong	  is	  pointed	  out	  in	  Rankin,	  “Observations	  on	  a	  Chinese	  Public	  Sphere,”	  160;	  and	  William	  T.	  Rowe,	  “The	  Problems	  of	  ‘Civil	  Society	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  China,”	  Modern	  China,	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  2,	  Symposium:	  "Public	  Sphere"/"Civil	  Society"	  in	  China?	  Paradigmatic	  Issues	  in	  Chinese	  Studies,	  III	  (Apr.,	  1993),	  142.	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Expanding	  from	  the	  usage	  of	  “public”	  as	  an	  adjective	  like	  the	  word	  gong,	  suggesting	  “common,”	  “collective,”	  and	  “open,”	  Chow	  also	  uses	  the	  term	  as	  a	  noun	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  auto-­‐organizations	  he	  examines,	  which	  invoked	  gong	  values.	  This	  thesis	  expands	  this	  usage	  to	  include	  any	  social	  groups	  that	  followed	  gong	  principles	  -­‐-­‐-­‐pursuing	  common	  interests,	  taking	  collective	  actions,	  and	  resorting	  to	  publicity	  of	  information.	  In	  this	  sense,	  “publics”	  not	  only	  indicates	  auto-­‐organizations	  such	  as	  native-­‐place	  associations,	  occupational	  associations,	  and	  lineages,	  but	  also	  refer	  to	  any	  other	  types	  of	  social	  groups	  which	  follow	  gong	  principles.	  For	  example,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  later,	  certain	  locally	  based	  communities,	  which	  are	  generally	  believed	  to	  be	  loosely	  bound	  simply	  by	  common	  location	  of	  residence,	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  publics.	  Sometimes,	  for	  practical	  reasons,	  multiple	  auto-­‐organizations	  or	  multiple	  communities	  also	  came	  together	  to	  form	  a	  network,	  making	  collective	  decisions	  and	  taking	  collective	  actions.	  In	  this	  case,	  they	  also	  constituted	  a	  single	  public.	  Therefore,	  a	  public	  could	  be	  one	  organization	  or	  a	  group	  of	  them	  working	  together.	  Whether	  they	  were	  loosely	  formed	  communities	  or	  systematically	  organized	  auto-­‐organizations,	  any	  types	  of	  social	  groups	  could	  be	  deemed	  publics	  as	  long	  as	  
gong	  principles	  were	  followed.	  A	  public	  is	  also	  not	  defined	  by	  its	  size.	  For	  example,	  a	  small	  pilgrim	  group	  attached	  to	  a	  temple	  with	  less	  than	  ten	  members	  and	  a	  large	  occupational	  association	  of	  a	  whole	  city	  could	  both	  be	  regarded	  as	  publics.	  	  
Concerning	  Chinese	  Muslims	  specifically,	  they	  first	  formed	  various	  auto-­‐organizations	  which	  were	  similar	  to	  those	  formed	  by	  Han	  Chinese	  gentry	  and	  merchants,	  such	  as	  lineages,	  and	  native-­‐place	  associations.	  When	  participating	  in	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those	  publics,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  often	  did	  not	  invoke	  their	  identity	  as	  Muslims.	  	  Chinese	  Muslims	  also	  participated	  in	  two	  types	  of	  unique	  publics	  which	  were	  formed	  based	  on	  their	  common	  religion	  and	  were	  thus	  exclusive	  of	  Han	  Chinese.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  jiaofang	  (publics	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  with	  the	  same	  mosque	  affiliation).	  Jiaofang	  were	  primarily	  locally	  based	  communities,	  but	  were	  not	  just	  as	  loosely	  bound	  as	  ordinary	  communities.	  Chinese	  Muslim	  jiaofang	  were	  well-­‐organized	  and	  managed	  collectively,	  and	  also	  promoted	  shared	  interests	  of	  their	  members.	  They	  provided	  local	  semi-­‐formal	  governance,	  and	  worked	  as	  economic	  enterprises	  for	  common	  prosperity	  of	  local	  communities.	  In	  some	  highly	  urbanized	  areas	  of	  Qing	  China	  such	  as	  Guangzhou,	  multiple	  local	  
jiaofang	  also	  developed	  into	  a	  network	  to	  promote	  interests	  of	  the	  larger	  Muslim	  community	  of	  the	  whole	  city.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  citywide	  community	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangzhou	  also	  worked	  as	  a	  public.	  The	  other	  public	  is	  the	  Ummah	  (the	  worldwide	  Islamic	  community	  of	  all	  adherents	  of	  Islam)	  of	  which	  Chinese	  Muslims	  ideally	  would	  recognize	  themselves	  as	  members.	  The	  Ummah	  in	  Qing	  China,	  unlike	  auto-­‐organizations	  and	  jiaofang,	  did	  not	  have	  a	  tangible	  organization	  undertaking	  collective	  actions	  and	  publishing	  information.	  It	  was	  a	  “potential”	  public,	  which	  was	  only	  invoked	  by	  certain	  groups	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  when	  it	  was	  beneficial	  to	  their	  shared	  interests,	  and	  would	  return	  to	  invisible	  as	  long	  as	  more	  immediate	  public	  interests	  were	  jeopardized.	  	  
	   	  Various	  publics	  often	  overlapped.	  In	  his	  research	  on	  the	  history	  of	  Chinese	  merchant	  associations,	  Ping-­‐ti	  Ho	  points	  out	  that	  in	  some	  Chinese	  cities	  such	  as	  Suzhou,	  there	  already	  existed	  both	  native-­‐place	  associations	  and	  occupational	  associations	  with	  overlapping	  membership	  at	  least	  since	  the	  late	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Ming.	  For	  example,	  a	  silk	  merchant	  in	  the	  19th-­‐century	  Suzhou,	  who	  came	  from	  Hangzhou,	  could	  participate	  in	  both	  the	  Hangzhou	  merchants’	  association	  in	  Suzhou,	  along	  with	  other	  sojourning	  merchants	  from	  Hangzhou	  who	  were	  engaged	  in	  various	  areas	  of	  business,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Suzhou	  silk	  merchants’	  association,	  which	  were	  formed	  by	  silk	  merchants	  in	  Suzhou	  regardless	  of	  their	  places	  of	  origin.21	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  also	  involved	  in	  multiple	  and	  overlapping	  publics	  in	  their	  daily	  life.	  Evidence	  will	  show	  that	  the	  two	  types	  of	  religious	  publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  only	  part	  of	  the	  publics	  in	  which	  they	  participated,	  and	  did	  not	  hinder	  their	  participation	  in	  other	  publics	  such	  as	  groups	  formed	  on	  common	  place	  of	  origin,	  gender,	  kinship,	  profession,	  and	  educational	  network,	  many	  of	  which	  they	  actually	  shared	  with	  Han	  Chinese.	  This	  Chapter	  first	  discusses	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  participation	  in	  the	  two	  types	  of	  religious	  publics.	  
	  
Local	  Mosques	  and	  Jiaofang	  	  
	   The	  Chinese	  term	  jiaofang	  教坊 refers	  to	  local	  publics	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  with	  the	  same	  mosque	  affiliation.	  During	  the	  Tang	  Dynasty,	  Muslims	  from	  Arabia	  and	  Persia	  started	  to	  travel	  to	  China	  for	  trading.	  They	  mainly	  stayed	  in	  Guangzhou,	  which	  was	  the	  largest	  port	  city.	  For	  easier	  management	  of	  those	  foreigners,	  during	  the	  Kaicheng	  period	  (836-­‐840),	  officials	  in	  Guangzhou	  designated	  specific	  areas	  for	  foreign	  Muslims	  to	  live	  in,	  which	  were	  called	  
fanfang	  蕃坊	  (residential	  areas	  of	  foreigners).	  	  In	  each	  fanfang,	  Muslims	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ho,	  A	  History	  of	  Huiguan	  in	  China,	  101-­‐103.	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established	  a	  mosque,	  which	  served	  as	  their	  religious,	  social,	  political,	  and	  legal	  center.	  In	  Ming	  and	  Qing	  period,	  though	  Muslims	  living	  in	  China	  proper	  were	  culturally	  assimilated	  and	  also	  became	  legal	  subjects,	  they	  maintained	  their	  way	  of	  living	  as	  relatively	  separate	  communities	  surrounding	  specific	  mosques.	  These	  communities	  were	  no	  longer	  called	  fanfang	  but	  jiaofang	  (residential	  areas	  of	  religious	  people).22	  
In	  the	  Qing	  period,	  a	  mosque	  still	  served	  as	  a	  public	  venue	  for	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  jiaofang	  and	  connected	  each	  Chinese	  Muslim	  within	  the	  jiaofang	  with	  one	  another.	  Mosques	  were	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  gongsuo 公所	  (public	  place/venue)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐sharing	  the	  same	  name	  with	  those	  meeting	  places	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  merchant	  associations,	  and	  ancestor	  halls	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  lineages,	  etc.	  In	  this	  sense,	  as	  Dillon	  argues,	  the	  growing	  scale	  of	  mosque	  building	  within	  China	  proper	  in	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries	  could	  serve	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  prosperity	  and	  increasing	  size	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  communities	  during	  that	  period.23	  	  
Millward	  also	  notices	  that	  when	  traveling	  in	  Xinjiang	  for	  trading,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  outside	  their	  hometowns	  quickly	  established	  their	  own	  mosques.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  who	  came	  from	  cities	  such	  as	  Xi’an	  and	  Lanzhou	  established	  different	  mosques	  and	  formed	  new	  publics	  based	  on	  their	  religion	  and	  native	  region	  in	  Xinjiang.	  Millward	  also	  points	  out	  that	  mosques	  in	  Xinjiang	  established	  by	  sojourning	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  from	  various	  regions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Su	  Xue	  and	  Liu	  Jin,	  “Historical	  Evolvement	  of	  the	  Social	  Functions	  of	  Mosques	  in	  China	  (zhongguo	  qingzhensi	  shehui	  gongneng	  de	  lishi	  yanbian	  中国清真寺社会功能的历史演变),”	  
Journal	  of	  Hebei	  University	  of	  Economics	  and	  Trade	  (Comprehensive	  Edition)	  (September	  2009):	  73,	  75;	  and	  Ma,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Chinese	  Islamic	  sects	  and	  the	  Institution	  of	  Menhuan,	  108-­‐109.	  23	  Michael	  Dillon,	  China’s	  Muslim	  Hui	  Community:	  Migration,	  Settlement	  and	  Sects	  (Richmond,	  England:	  Curzon	  Press,	  1999),	  48.	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resembled	  those	  mosques	  in	  their	  hometowns	  in	  appearance.24	  Millward’s	  example	  shows	  how	  a	  public	  of	  jiaofang	  could	  still	  connect	  a	  group	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  even	  when	  members	  were	  far	  away	  from	  their	  native	  jiaofang	  community.	  	  
	  
Supporting	  Local	  Mosques	  
How	  active	  were	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  jiaofang?	  It	  can	  be	  partly	  reflected	  by	  large	  numbers	  of	  steles	  recording	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  donation	  to	  their	  local	  mosques.	  Donation	  was	  generally	  made	  in	  the	  forms	  of	  money,	  land,	  and	  houses.	  It	  was	  a	  popular	  practice	  for	  Chinese	  Muslims	  to	  ask	  their	  children	  or	  other	  family	  members	  to	  donate	  their	  property	  to	  mosques	  after	  their	  death.	  	  
Chinese	  Muslims	  usually	  had	  specific	  requirements	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  usage	  of	  their	  donations,	  and	  words	  like	  “it	  cannot	  be	  used	  for	  other	  purposes	  with	  any	  excuses	  (不得借故预收作别项使费)”	  were	  not	  rarely	  seen	  on	  steles.	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  demands	  for	  proper	  usage	  of	  their	  donations	  suggests	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  authentic	  devotion	  to	  and	  concern	  for	  their	  jiaofang.	  Donors	  commonly	  wished	  to	  provide	  financial	  support	  for	  purchasing	  sacrifices,	  holding	  feasts	  in	  holy	  days,	  aid	  to	  the	  poor	  and	  funeral	  expenses,	  employing	  religious	  teachers,	  and	  aiding	  the	  maintenance	  of	  Islamic	  schools.	  
Sometimes,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  donors	  also	  expected	  something	  in	  return	  from	  the	  mosques.	  Children	  who	  donated	  their	  parent’s	  property	  often	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Millward,	  Beyond	  the	  Pass,	  169.	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requested	  Islamic	  teachers	  in	  mosques	  to	  pray	  for	  their	  parents	  during	  their	  death	  anniversaries.	  Therefore,	  on	  steles	  where	  their	  donation	  was	  recorded,	  death	  anniversaries	  of	  donors	  or	  family	  members	  of	  donors	  were	  sometimes	  clearly	  written	  down.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  after	  her	  husband	  and	  daughter	  died,	  a	  Chinese	  Muslim	  woman	  in	  Guangzhou	  donated	  her	  family’s	  estate	  to	  the	  local	  mosque	  for	  purchasing	  sacrifices	  during	  death	  anniversaries	  of	  saints	  and	  other	  public	  expenses.	  On	  a	  stele	  recording	  an	  extended	  explanation	  of	  her	  donation,	  the	  birthdays	  and	  death	  anniversaries	  of	  her	  patrimonial	  family,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  own	  birthday,	  were	  all	  listed	  at	  the	  bottom.	  It	  states	  that	  during	  those	  death	  anniversaries,	  one	  yuan	  could	  be	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  rents	  of	  her	  donated	  property	  for	  incense	  and	  service	  expenses	  rendered	  for	  Islamic	  teachers	  to	  visit	  their	  tombs	  and	  pray	  for	  them.	  
As	  an	  upgraded	  form	  of	  individual	  donation,	  many	  autonomous	  fund-­‐raising	  groups	  were	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing,	  with	  the	  specific	  goal	  of	  raising	  money	  for	  local	  mosques.	  Many	  of	  them	  had	  their	  own	  rules	  to	  protect	  communal	  money	  from	  being	  embezzled.	  A	  well-­‐known	  example	  is	  
xiaohui ⼩小会	  (small	  club)	  in	  Yunnan	  which	  was	  established	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century.	  The	  group	  expanded	  from	  a	  couple	  Chinese	  Muslims	  to	  26	  members	  in	  1817.	  They	  contributed	  their	  own	  money	  to	  renovating	  the	  local	  mosque.	  To	  enlarge	  the	  influence	  of	  their	  local	  jiaofang,	  they	  also	  donated	  money	  to	  support	  non-­‐native	  Muslims	  coming	  to	  study	  in	  the	  Islamic	  school	  affiliated	  to	  the	  local	  mosque.25	  In	  1860,	  a	  group	  in	  Henan	  -­‐-­‐-­‐which	  was	  called	  jijin	  hui	  积⾦金会	  (club	  of	  accumulated	  funds)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐was	  established	  by	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  The	  group	  was	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specially	  organized	  to	  raise	  funds	  to	  support	  the	  local	  Islamic	  school.	  They	  had	  a	  purpose	  similar	  to	  xiaohui	  (small	  club)-­‐-­‐-­‐	  to	  expand	  the	  influence	  of	  Islam	  and	  to	  attract	  non-­‐native	  Muslims	  to	  the	  local	  jiaofang	  (吾教⼤大兴，近悦远来).	  The	  group	  also	  formulated	  rules	  of	  management	  agreed	  upon	  by	  all	  of	  its	  members.	  The	  rules	  mainly	  state	  that	  members	  could	  not	  quit	  at	  will,	  and	  they	  could	  not	  lend	  public	  money	  to	  others	  for	  personal	  profits.26	  In	  1844,	  a	  similar	  group	  called	  
sufushaosheng	  tang 溯夫绍圣堂 was	  established	  in	  Guangdong.	  The	  group	  kept	  operating	  at	  least	  until	  1979.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  group	  was	  to	  contribute	  money	  to	  the	  local	  mosque	  for	  holding	  ceremonies	  and	  feasts	  during	  holy	  days.27	  There	  were	  also	  analogous	  groups	  formed	  exclusively	  by	  females.	  In	  1794,	  a	  group	  called	  yixin	  hui	  懿馨会	  was	  formed	  by	  30	  female	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangxi.	  The	  group	  was	  established	  to	  commemorate	  the	  daughter	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad.	  Group	  members	  contributed	  money,	  bought	  a	  house	  together,	  and	  donated	  it	  to	  the	  local	  mosque.	  The	  group	  continued	  to	  operate	  and	  expand	  at	  least	  until	  1830.28	  	  	  
Apart	  from	  forming	  groups	  to	  support	  local	  mosques,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  also	  formed	  mutual-­‐help	  groups	  within	  their	  jiaofang.	  A	  very	  famous	  mutual-­‐help	  group	  was	  established	  in	  1716	  in	  Guangdong	  by	  27	  Chinese	  Muslim	  elders.	  They	  contributed	  money	  to	  buying	  communal	  shops,	  and	  used	  the	  profits	  to	  support	  their	  funerals.	  After	  more	  than	  40	  years	  when	  all	  the	  members	  passed	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  27	  Ma	  Jianzhao	  and	  Zhang	  Shuhui,	  Supplementing	  Archival	  Records	  on	  the	  Hui	  Nationality	  in	  
Southern	  China	  (Zhongguo	  nanfang	  huizu	  guji	  ziliao	  xuanbian	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  中国南方回族古籍资料选编补
遗)	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  Press,	  2006),	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away,	  their	  descendants	  followed	  the	  agreement	  of	  the	  group	  and	  donated	  its	  public	  property	  to	  two	  local	  mosques.29	  
	  
Supporting	  Local	  Islamic	  Schools	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  usually	  had	  specific	  requirements	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  usage	  of	  their	  donations.	  Among	  those	  common	  requirements,	  aiding	  the	  maintenance	  of	  local	  Islamic	  schools	  was	  the	  most	  popular	  one,	  suggesting	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  intention	  to	  preserve	  the	  religious	  tradition	  of	  their	  
jiaofang.	  Increasing	  support	  for	  building	  local	  Islamic	  schools	  was	  related	  to	  the	  Islamic	  revival	  starting	  in	  the	  late	  Ming	  and	  early	  Qing	  period.	  	  
Generally,	  large	  mosques	  in	  the	  Arab	  and	  Islamic	  world	  are	  also	  important	  educational	  institutions.	  Before	  the	  late	  Ming	  and	  early	  Qing	  period,	  however,	  this	  educational	  function	  was	  absent	  in	  Chinese	  mosques.	  The	  situation	  started	  to	  change	  in	  the	  late	  Ming.	  Concerned	  about	  the	  degree	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  assimilation	  to	  Chinese	  culture	  and	  their	  gradual	  loss	  of	  religious	  distinction,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  literati	  initiated	  a	  movement	  of	  Islamic	  revival.	  One	  of	  their	  ways	  to	  revive	  the	  Islamic	  awareness	  of	  common	  Chinese	  Muslims	  was	  to	  establish	  free	  and	  public	  Islamic	  schools	  inside	  mosques,	  which	  was	  called	  “scripture	  hall	  education”	  (jingtang	  jiaoyu	  经堂教育).	  Those	  schools	  borrowed	  the	  form	  of	  private	  schools	  (sishu	  私塾)	  from	  Han	  Chinese,	  but	  different	  in	  terms	  of	  location	  and	  curricula.	  An	  Islamic	  school	  usually	  taught	  classic	  Islamic	  texts,	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basic	  Arabic	  language,	  and	  sometimes	  also	  Persian.	  Some	  big	  and	  influential	  schools	  also	  taught	  more	  sophisticated	  Islamic	  works.30	  
The	  scripture	  hall	  education	  changed	  the	  teaching	  and	  learning	  of	  Islamic	  texts	  in	  China	  proper	  from	  personal	  activities	  between	  teachers	  and	  students	  or	  between	  fathers	  and	  sons	  to	  public	  activities.	  Active	  participation	  in	  supporting	  local	  Islamic	  schools	  also	  reflected	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  intention	  to	  preserve	  the	  religious	  tradition	  of	  their	  jiaofang.	  	  
	  
Sojourning	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Local	  Jiaofang	  
Undoubtedly	  Chinese	  Muslims	  travelled.	  Sometimes,	  like	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  in	  Xinjiang,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  built	  their	  own	  mosques	  in	  sojourning	  places	  when	  traveling	  in	  China	  proper.	  In	  1708,	  for	  example,	  a	  group	  of	  Muslim	  merchants	  from	  Jiangnan	  contributed	  money	  to	  building	  a	  mosque	  in	  Foshan,	  Guangdong,	  which	  was	  on	  their	  regular	  trading	  route.31	  	  	  
There	  were	  also	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  who	  chose	  to	  go	  to	  specific	  mosques	  in	  cities	  where	  they	  regularly	  traded.	  Though	  not	  belonging	  to	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  jiaofang,	  those	  sojourning	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  were	  highly	  involved	  in	  those	  local	  publics.	  For	  instance,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  commonly	  praying	  in	  the	  Lianhuajie	  Mosque	  in	  Xiangtan,	  Hunan	  included	  not	  only	  the	  local	  
jiaofang,	  but	  also	  the	  Jiangnan	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  association	  and	  the	  Henan	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  association.	  In	  1892	  when	  a	  conflict	  arose	  in	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terms	  of	  management	  of	  the	  mosque,	  the	  two	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  associations	  were	  invited	  to	  discuss	  the	  issue	  together	  with	  the	  local	  jiaofang.	  They	  worked	  together	  and	  formulated	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  property	  of	  the	  mosque.32	  	  The	  case	  indicated	  that	  the	  two	  merchant	  associations	  had	  close	  connection	  with	  the	  local	  jiaofang	  and	  even	  significant	  power.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  were	  also	  big	  donors	  of	  the	  mosque.	  
Apart	  from	  traveling	  merchants,	  large	  numbers	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  serving	  in	  the	  Qing	  military	  were	  also	  often	  outside	  their	  native	  jiaofang.	  In	  Guangdong,	  where	  one	  major	  banner	  garrison	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  stationed,	  many	  sojourning	  Chinese	  Muslim	  bannermen	  were	  also	  actively	  engaged	  in	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics.	  For	  example,	  in	  1697,	  a	  stele	  was	  erected	  to	  record	  the	  good	  deed	  of	  Hong	  Jin	  洪瑾,	  who	  was	  a	  descendant	  of	  the	  Hong’s	  in	  Shandong	  -­‐-­‐-­‐which	  was	  a	  renowned	  lineage	  of	  Islamic	  teachers.	  He	  moved	  to	  Guangzhou	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Plain	  Yellow	  Banner	  (zhenghuangqi	  正黄旗).	  To	  commemorate	  his	  virtuous	  daughter-­‐in-­‐law,	  he	  bought	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  in	  Guangzhou	  for	  her	  burial	  and	  also	  donated	  it	  as	  a	  free	  cemetery	  for	  all	  other	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangzhou	  who	  did	  not	  own	  a	  burial	  place.33	  
	  
Various	  Degrees	  of	  Participation	  in	  Jiaofang	  
Despite	  the	  generally	  active	  public	  culture	  of	  jiaofang,	  not	  every	  Chinese	  Muslim	  participated	  with	  the	  same	  level	  of	  engagement.	  As	  Dillon	  points	  out,	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Chinese	  Muslims’	  degree	  of	  integration	  into	  the	  mainstream	  society	  “varied	  from	  community	  to	  community	  and	  from	  individual	  to	  individual.”34	  There	  were	  those	  who	  became	  religious	  professionals,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  were	  increasingly	  drawn	  into	  the	  mainstream	  society,	  participating	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  examination	  and	  becoming	  officials.	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  degree	  of	  involvement	  in	  their	  religious	  publics	  varied	  significantly.	  	  
Compared	  with	  Chinese	  Muslim	  commoners	  and	  merchants	  in	  earlier	  examples,	  those	  who	  became	  officials	  were	  generally	  less	  involved	  in	  donation	  to	  mosques.	  They	  often	  did	  so	  only	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  request	  of	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  who	  initiated	  donation	  activities.	  For	  example,	  in	  1855,	  a	  mosque	  in	  Nanchong,	  Sichuan	  were	  lack	  of	  financial	  support	  and	  difficult	  to	  survive.	  Worried	  about	  the	  circumstance,	  the	  Islamic	  teacher	  of	  the	  mosque	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  of	  the	  local	  jiaofang	  decided	  to	  travel	  around	  the	  province	  to	  raise	  funds	  (赴省募化).	  Many	  officials	  indeed	  made	  donation	  when	  reached	  by	  them.35	  	  
High-­‐ranking	  Chinese	  Muslim	  officials,	  if	  actively	  participating	  in	  charitable	  activities,	  often	  chose	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  charities	  with	  specific	  Islamic	  features.	  For	  example,	  the	  famous	  first-­‐ranking	  Chinese	  Muslim	  official	  Liu	  Fengwu	  刘凤舞	  funded	  many	  charities.	  He	  supported	  free	  Confucian	  schools,	  poor	  scholars	  who	  wanted	  to	  take	  the	  civil	  service	  examination,	  and	  disaster	  victims,	  etc.	  None	  of	  those	  activities	  could	  be	  clearly	  attributed	  to	  his	  religious	  orientation.	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Compared	  with	  high-­‐ranking	  officials,	  lower-­‐ranking	  Chinese	  Muslim	  officials	  seemed	  to	  be	  less	  concerned	  about	  participating	  in	  activities	  of	  their	  religious	  publics,	  probably	  because	  they	  were	  more	  locally	  based	  and	  faced	  less	  pressure	  of	  acculturation	  from	  their	  working	  environment.	  For	  example,	  Jin	  Baofu	  ⾦金宝符	  was	  a	  fifth-­‐ranking	  official	  who	  were	  very	  active	  in	  his	  native	  
jiaofang	  and	  several	  neighboring	  jiaofang	  in	  Jinan,	  Shandong.	  His	  wife	  funded	  renovation	  of	  an	  Islamic	  school	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan	  in	  the	  mid	  19th	  century.36	  In	  1865,	  he	  also	  donated	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  to	  the	  Xiaojinzhuang	  Mosque	  in	  Jinan.	  In	  1873,	  after	  he	  died,	  his	  wife	  donated	  another	  piece	  of	  land	  to	  the	  mosque.37	  He	  was	  also	  the	  author	  of	  several	  inscriptions	  on	  steles	  erected	  in	  both	  the	  Southern	  and	  the	  Northern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan.	  In	  another	  case	  in	  1862,	  the	  local	  magistrate	  of	  the	  Nanchong	  County,	  Sichuan	  named	  Li	  Sui	  李璲	  gathered	  the	  local	  gentry	  and	  raised	  fund	  to	  renovate	  the	  local	  mosque	  in	  Nanchong.	  He	  not	  only	  initiated	  the	  donation	  activity,	  but	  also	  donated	  almost	  200	  tales	  of	  silver,	  and	  gathered	  the	  local	  gentry	  and	  formulated	  rules	  to	  manage	  the	  mosque.	  In	  the	  inscription	  written	  by	  him,	  he	  also	  stated	  that	  he	  was	  luckily	  selected	  as	  the	  magistrate	  of	  Nanchong	  because	  of	  the	  bliss	  of	  the	  Allah	  (蒙真主
默佑),	  explicitly	  showing	  his	  religious	  devotion.38	  	  
Different	  from	  incumbent	  officials	  who	  might	  face	  pressure	  of	  integration	  into	  mainstream	  Chinese	  culture	  and	  therefore	  chose	  not	  to	  invoke	  their	  religious	  distinctiveness,	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  had	  no	  concerns	  in	  that	  aspect	  because	  they	  were	  locally	  based.	  Active	  engagement	  in	  local	  publics	  was	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also	  a	  necessity	  for	  them	  to	  maintain	  their	  local	  influence	  and	  authority.	  The	  gentry	  were	  degree	  holders	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  examination	  who	  did	  not	  fulfill	  a	  government	  position	  or	  had	  retired	  and	  therefore	  stayed	  in	  their	  home	  jiaofang.	  Like	  the	  case	  of	  Han	  Chinese,	  the	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  often	  actual	  managers	  of	  local	  communities	  whom	  officials	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  to	  deal	  with	  local	  affairs	  and	  maintain	  local	  order.	  	  
The	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  comfortable	  with	  their	  overlapping	  identities	  as	  both	  Muslims	  and	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  and	  generally	  happy	  to	  be	  managers	  of	  local	  mosques.	  They	  were	  also	  actively	  engaged	  in	  raising	  funds	  for	  local	  mosques.	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  also	  often	  the	  authors	  and	  calligraphers	  of	  steles	  erected	  in	  mosques.	  A	  retired	  high	  Chinese	  Muslim	  official	  as	  the	  author	  or	  calligrapher	  could	  add	  value,	  influence,	  and	  authority	  to	  an	  inscription.	  In	  remote	  areas	  without	  such	  figures,	  local	  jiaofang	  would	  at	  least	  invited	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  who	  had	  passed	  the	  first	  level	  (county	  level)	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  examination	  to	  be	  authors	  and	  calligraphers	  of	  inscriptions.	  In	  inscriptions,	  there	  were	  sometimes	  statements	  such	  as	  “I	  was	  invited	  to	  write	  a	  passage	  to	  record	  this	  (索记于余).”	  It	  reflected	  that	  the	  level	  of	  education	  in	  Chinese	  classics	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  examination	  of	  the	  Qing	  state	  were	  no	  less	  valued	  in	  the	  religious	  publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  than	  Han	  Chinese	  publics.	  	  
In	  rural	  areas	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  communities	  where	  there	  were	  no	  or	  few	  member	  of	  the	  gentry,	  Islamic	  teachers	  of	  mosques	  were	  the	  local	  elite.	  And	  it	  was	  them	  who	  led	  and	  managed	  the	  local	  jiaofang.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  village	  in	  Yunnan	  in	  1811,	  the	  local	  mosque	  was	  built	  with	  donation	  made	  by	  several	  local	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Islamic	  teachers.	  On	  the	  stele	  which	  was	  erected	  to	  record	  their	  good	  deed,	  people	  who	  erected	  the	  stele	  were	  written	  as	  “Islamic	  teachers	  and	  people	  of	  the	  whole	  village	  who	  were	  gathered	  by	  the	  teachers,”	  clearly	  indicating	  the	  elite	  status	  of	  local	  Islamic	  teachers	  in	  that	  village.39	  
	  
Mosques	  as	  Economic	  Enterprises	  
With	  abundant	  financial	  support	  from	  Chinese	  Muslim	  jiaofang,	  mosques	  in	  Qing	  China	  were	  able	  to	  function	  as	  enterprises	  participating	  in	  social	  economy.	  A	  Qing	  mosque	  was	  at	  least	  able	  to	  maintain	  self-­‐sufficiency	  by	  renting	  land	  and	  houses	  donated	  by	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  the	  jiaofang.	  Some	  wealthy	  mosques	  also	  had	  extra	  money	  to	  purchase	  more	  land	  and	  houses.	  For	  example,	  the	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan,	  Shandong	  had	  abundant	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  jiaofang	  to	  maintain	  self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  develop	  as	  a	  large-­‐scale	  Islamic	  center	  in	  China	  proper.	  It	  not	  only	  included	  the	  main	  mosque	  for	  prayers	  and	  ceremonies,	  but	  also	  one	  small	  mosque	  affiliated	  to	  it	  for	  meditation	  and	  supplementary	  prayers.	  It	  also	  had	  two	  independent	  Islamic	  schools.	  One	  was	  open	  for	  Chinese	  Muslim	  children,	  called	  xiaoxue	  ⼩小学	  (small	  school;	  school	  for	  children)	  and	  the	  other	  was	  open	  for	  more	  advanced	  learners	  of	  Islamic	  classics,	  called	  daxue	  ⼤大学	  (big	  school;	  advanced	  school).	  The	  scale	  of	  the	  Northern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  Southern	  Mosque.	  A	  stele	  in	  1840	  recorded	  a	  title	  deed	  in	  which	  a	  person	  Huang	  Tingzhu	  sold	  his	  land	  of	  more	  than	  17	  mu	  (around	  11333	  square	  meters)	  to	  the	  Northern	  Mosque.	  It	  was	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a	  standard	  transaction	  with	  a	  broker	  mediating	  the	  business	  and	  a	  title	  deed	  written	  down	  during	  the	  transaction.	  The	  mosque	  participated	  in	  this	  activity	  as	  an	  ordinary	  economic	  enterprise.40	  	  
Both	  donated	  and	  purchased	  land	  and	  property	  were	  commonly	  not	  regarded	  as	  privately	  owned	  by	  a	  mosque,	  though.	  It	  would	  be	  clearer	  if	  we	  say	  mosques	  served	  as	  representatives	  of	  entire	  jiaofang	  when	  participating	  in	  social	  economy.	  Therefore,	  property	  of	  mosques	  were	  indeed	  public	  property	  of	  
jiaofang,	  which	  were	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  gongtian	  公⽥田	  (public/communal	  land)	  and	  gongchan	  公产	  (public/	  communal	  property).	  In	  Qing	  China,	  big	  mosques	  often	  had	  complex	  rules	  and	  regulations	  to	  manage	  public	  property,	  which	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  rules	  of	  property	  management	  developed	  by	  Han	  Chinese	  auto-­‐organizations.	  Generally,	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  or	  other	  local	  elite	  such	  as	  the	  elders	  (xianglao	  乡⽼老/xiangqi	  乡耆)	  took	  turns	  to	  be	  managers	  of	  mosques	  and	  kept	  clear	  and	  detailed	  accounts.	  
	  
Recognition	  of	  the	  Ummah	  in	  Qing	  China	  	  
Apart	  from	  participating	  in	  jiaofang,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  also	  shared	  a	  common	  Islamic	  public	  -­‐-­‐-­‐the	  Ummah	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  of	  which	  ideally	  every	  adherent	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  world	  was	  a	  member.	  Even	  though	  there	  was	  no	  formal	  institution	  connecting	  every	  jiaofang	  in	  China	  proper,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  generally	  followed	  the	  Islamic	  spirit	  and	  recognized	  each	  Muslim	  (Chinese	  as	  well	  as	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foreign	  Muslims)	  as	  a	  family	  member	  (jiaoqin	  教亲).	  For	  example,	  Islamic	  schools	  were	  often	  not	  only	  open	  to	  the	  local	  jiaofang,	  but	  all	  Muslims	  who	  would	  like	  to	  go	  there.	  For	  instance,	  in	  previous	  examples,	  xiaohui	  ⼩小会	  (small	  club)	  not	  only	  funded	  renovation	  of	  the	  local	  mosque	  but	  also	  provided	  financial	  support	  for	  non-­‐native	  Muslims	  coming	  to	  study	  in	  the	  Islamic	  school	  affiliated	  to	  the	  local	  mosque.	  	  Similarly,	  jijin	  hui	  积⾦金会	  (club	  of	  accumulated	  funds)	  which	  was	  specially	  organized	  to	  raise	  funds	  to	  support	  local	  Islamic	  school	  stated	  its	  purpose	  as	  to	  expand	  the	  influence	  of	  Islam	  and	  to	  attract	  non-­‐native	  Muslims.	  
In	  1782,	  a	  Chinese	  Muslim	  Hai	  Furun	  海富润	  was	  arrested	  in	  Guangxi	  for	  carrying	  Islamic	  books,	  which	  were	  mistaken	  for	  books	  of	  heterodoxy	  by	  local	  officials.	  Before	  his	  arrest,	  he	  had	  travelled	  and	  studied	  in	  major	  mosques	  around	  China	  proper	  for	  over	  seven	  years.	  Those	  books	  were	  given	  as	  presents	  by	  a	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  Yuan	  Guozuo	  袁国祚	  when	  Hai	  sojourned	  in	  a	  local	  mosque	  in	  Hankou.	  
In	  1841,	  a	  Chinese	  Muslim	  in	  Guangzhou	  donated	  a	  shop	  to	  the	  local	  Islamic	  school	  as	  “public	  property”	  (gongchan	  公产).	  Content	  of	  the	  stele	  recording	  his	  donation	  reflected	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  Islamic	  schools	  in	  maintaining	  their	  religious	  “root”	  (genben	  根本)	  and	  in	  expanding	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Ummah:	  
I	  once	  heard	  that	  learning	  scriptures	  were	  the	  root	  of	  Islam.	  With	  the	  root,	  branches	  and	  leaves	  grow.	  With	  branches	  and	  leaves,	  flowers	  and	  fruits	  grow.	  Fruits	  then	  become	  ripe	  and	  the	  process	  never	  ends.	  Life	  follows	  the	  root.	  Thousands	  of	  generations	  then	  follow.	  There	  won’t	  be	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any	  limit.	  If	  people	  of	  our	  religion	  are	  able	  to	  read	  Islamic	  classics	  and	  scriptures,	  and	  pass	  to	  our	  offspring,	  our	  community	  will	  endure	  forever.41	  
Qing	  mosques	  also	  offered	  free	  accommodation	  and	  traveling	  expenses	  to	  Muslim	  travellers.	  Rules	  of	  a	  mosque	  in	  Hunan	  in	  1823	  state	  that	  all	  non-­‐native	  Muslims	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  stay	  for	  one	  night	  and	  offered	  with	  two	  meals	  for	  free,	  and	  the	  mosque	  would	  also	  provide	  them	  with	  traveling	  expenses.42	  Similarly,	  in	  1825,	  a	  set	  of	  quanshan	  tiaoyue	  劝善条约	  (Guidance	  for	  Goodness)	  in	  a	  mosque	  in	  Shandong	  included	  the	  following	  articles:	  
If	  there	  are	  people	  in	  the	  world	  who	  know	  well	  about	  Islamic	  classics,	  respect	  and	  love	  them.	  Take	  your	  books	  and	  ask	  them	  your	  questions,	  or	  listen	  to	  their	  teachings.	  If	  they	  stay,	  take	  turns	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  food.	  If	  they	  leave,	  raise	  money	  and	  provide	  them	  with	  traveling	  expenses.	  You	  cannot	  neglect	  their	  needs	  and	  make	  guests	  faraway	  disappointed.	  	  
Help	  those	  adherents	  of	  Islam	  (教中之⼈人)	  who	  are	  impoverished.	  Give	  them	  clothes,	  food,	  or	  traveling	  expenses.	  You	  cannot	  let	  them	  unable	  to	  return	  home	  or	  feel	  hopeless.	  
It	  is	  a	  traditional	  virtue	  to	  help	  people	  with	  funerals	  and	  weddings.	  Also,	  us	  adherents	  of	  Islam	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  group	  (同教⼀一体).	  Our	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  GYGY,	  24.	  42	  ZHJL,	  386-­‐388.	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fates	  are	  bound	  together	  (休戚相关).	  We	  must	  help	  each	  other…	  It	  is	  not	  only	  out	  of	  our	  sympathy,	  but	  also	  required	  by	  Islamic	  teachings...43	  
	   In	  the	  late	  Qing,	  two	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangzhou	  donated	  their	  money	  and	  built	  a	  wing-­‐building	  (别室)	  next	  to	  the	  local	  mosque.	  They	  made	  the	  donation	  because	  many	  impoverished	  Muslims	  were	  living	  inside	  the	  mosque,	  making	  it	  untidy	  and	  disordered.	  They	  built	  the	  new	  building	  to	  hold	  those	  homeless	  Muslims	  both	  from	  and	  outside	  the	  local	  community	  (内外远近贫难亲
友).44	  	  
To	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  some	  regions,	  recognition	  of	  the	  Ummah,	  which	  helped	  Chinese	  Muslim	  communities	  connect	  with	  each	  other,	  was	  a	  latent	  hazard	  to	  local	  economic	  interests.	  A	  petition	  to	  the	  local	  magistrate	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Jiangsu	  in	  1881	  requested	  the	  official	  to	  issue	  a	  notice	  prohibiting	  against	  the	  practice	  of	  non-­‐native	  Muslims	  who	  forced	  the	  mosque	  to	  offer	  them	  free	  accommodation	  and	  traveling	  expenses.45	  	  The	  case	  shows	  that	  there	  was	  a	  possible	  tension	  between	  non-­‐native	  Muslims	  who	  wanted	  free	  accommodation	  and	  traveling	  expenses	  and	  local	  mosques	  which	  offered	  those.	  It	  also	  reveals	  the	  limited	  recognition	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  worldwide	  Islamic	  public	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  especially	  when	  it	  jeopardized	  the	  interests	  of	  local	  jiaofang.	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  Wang	  Guoping	  and	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  Lixing,	  Selected	  Steles	  Related	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  Social	  History	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Chapter	  3	  Interaction	  between	  Jiaofang	  and	  the	  State	  Identity	  of	  Chinese	  
Muslims	  
As	  Liang	  Zhiping	  argues	  in	  his	  book	  on	  Qing	  law,	  in	  Qing	  China,	  the	  state	  intervened	  little	  in	  local	  order.	  Various	  auto-­‐organizations	  and	  social	  groups	  developed	  independently	  with	  their	  own	  hierarchy,	  goals,	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  They	  were	  locally	  based	  and	  constituted	  the	  foundation	  of	  local	  order.46	  Nonetheless,	  primarily,	  those	  local	  publics	  emerged	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  and	  their	  public	  culture	  developed	  within	  long-­‐term	  interactions	  -­‐-­‐-­‐accommodation	  as	  well	  as	  resistance	  -­‐-­‐-­‐with	  the	  state	  discourse,	  policies,	  and	  laws.	  This	  chapter	  looks	  at	  how	  public	  culture	  of	  jiaofang	  adjusted	  to	  or	  responded	  to	  the	  state	  identity	  imposed	  on	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  	  
Mosques’	  Loss	  of	  Legal	  Authority	  in	  Jiaofang	  
Unlike	  other	  popular	  religions	  in	  China	  such	  as	  Buddhism	  and	  Daoism,	  Islam	  also	  regulates	  the	  legal	  and	  political	  life	  of	  its	  adherents.	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  is	  no	  less	  important	  than	  Islamic	  scripture.	  In	  pre-­‐modern	  times,	  a	  mosque	  in	  the	  Arab	  and	  Islamic	  world	  generally	  also	  served	  as	  a	  judicial	  court	  dealing	  with	  local	  disputes.47	  A	  Chinese	  mosque	  during	  the	  Yuan	  dynasty	  (1271-­‐1368)	  was	  very	  similar	  to	  a	  mosque	  in	  Arab	  countries.	  In	  each	  mosque,	  there	  was	  a	  judge	  (qadi;	  Chinese:	  哈的)	  attending	  to	  local	  legal	  affairs	  including	  penalties,	  household	  registration,	  marriages,	  distribution	  of	  local	  resources,	  and	  legal	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  梁治平,	  Customary	  Law	  in	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  Society	  and	  the	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  (qingdai	  
xiguanfa:	  shehui	  yu	  guojia	  清代习惯法:	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  (Beijing:	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  University	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  Science	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  Press,	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conflicts,	  etc.48	  Such	  a	  judicial	  function	  was	  totally	  lost	  in	  Qing	  mosques.	  Historical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  resorted	  to	  Qing	  laws	  and	  officials	  even	  for	  personal,	  family,	  and	  religious	  matters.	  
For	  instance,	  in	  1907,	  a	  group	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  Hebei	  filed	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  local	  government	  regarding	  the	  local	  custom	  of	  requesting	  lavish	  betrothal	  presents.	  Those	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  firstly	  worked	  together	  and	  came	  up	  with	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  (zhangcheng	  章程)	  regulating	  the	  amount	  of	  betrothal	  presents.	  They	  then	  petitioned	  the	  local	  government	  requesting	  an	  official	  notice	  to	  be	  issued	  to	  recognize	  those	  rules.	  The	  government	  later	  approved	  their	  request,	  announcing	  that	  all	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  marriages	  should	  follow	  the	  rules,	  and	  those	  who	  violated	  them	  would	  be	  punished	  by	  the	  government.	  The	  government	  also	  gave	  an	  order	  to	  local	  Islamic	  teachers,	  asking	  them	  to	  oversee	  the	  matter.49	  This	  example	  demonstrates	  that	  common	  Chinese	  Muslims	  followed	  Qing	  government	  orders	  even	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  marriage.	  Similarly,	  in	  1905,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  a	  village	  in	  Tianjin	  petitioned	  the	  Tianjin	  provincial	  government,	  requesting	  an	  official	  notice	  prohibiting	  local	  practices	  of	  same-­‐surname	  marriages.50	  	  	  
Chinese	  Muslims	  even	  resorted	  to	  Qing	  officials	  for	  issues	  of	  managing	  mosques.	  In	  1881,	  a	  group	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  the	  Wu	  County,	  Jiangsu	  petitioned	  the	  local	  magistrate,	  stating	  that	  Islamic	  teachers	  of	  the	  local	  mosque	  wanted	  to	  occupy	  their	  positions	  by	  passing	  their	  positions	  directly	  to	  their	  sons.	  This	  practice	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  terms	  of	  their	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leadership	  over	  the	  mosque	  and	  their	  power	  of	  managing	  public	  property	  of	  the	  mosque.	  They	  wanted	  the	  local	  government	  to	  issue	  a	  notice	  regulating	  the	  way	  of	  selecting	  Islamic	  teachers.51	  	  This	  example	  betrays	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  recognized	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Qing	  government	  even	  concerning	  leadership	  of	  mosques.	  	  
Apart	  from	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry,	  sometimes	  Islamic	  teachers	  also	  reached	  out	  to	  the	  Qing	  government	  for	  internal	  affairs	  of	  local	  mosques.	  In	  1784,	  an	  Islamic	  teacher	  in	  Henan	  was	  nearing	  70	  years	  old.	  He	  was	  worried	  that	  Islamic	  teachers	  who	  were	  going	  to	  take	  his	  position	  could	  not	  follow	  the	  old	  rules	  and	  traditions	  of	  the	  mosque	  that	  had	  been	  kept	  since	  the	  Tang	  dynasty.	  He	  then	  filed	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  local	  magistrate	  and	  requested	  the	  official	  to	  issue	  a	  notice	  that	  could	  prevent	  such	  circumstances.	  Later,	  the	  local	  magistrate	  issued	  a	  public	  notice	  informing	  every	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  that	  if	  successive	  Islamic	  teachers	  did	  not	  keep	  old	  traditions,	  managers	  of	  the	  mosque	  could	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  court.52	  Those	  examples	  above	  show	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  comfortable	  with	  their	  legal	  identity	  as	  Qing	  subjects	  and	  they	  recognized	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Qing	  government	  in	  regulating	  their	  jiaofang	  and	  mosques.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Wang	  and	  Tang,	  Selected	  Steles	  Related	  to	  the	  Social	  History	  of	  Suzhou	  since	  the	  Ming	  and	  Qing,	  448.	  52	  Stele	  of	  Prohibition	  (qingzhensi	  shijinbei	  清真寺示禁碑),	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Mosque	  of	  Kaifeng,	  Henan,	  May	  1,	  1784.	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Appealing	  to	  the	  Qing	  State	  
	   Chinese	  Muslims	  not	  only	  recognized	  their	  legal	  category	  as	  Qing	  subjects,	  but	  also	  consciously	  presented	  themselves	  as	  law-­‐abiding	  subjects	  and	  tried	  to	  win	  support	  or	  legal	  protection	  from	  the	  Qing	  government.	  For	  instance,	  in	  1843,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  Fujian	  who	  had	  donated	  their	  money	  in	  building	  the	  local	  mosque	  filed	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  local	  magistrate,	  requesting	  the	  official	  to	  issue	  a	  notice	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  property	  of	  the	  mosque.	  In	  their	  petition,	  in	  order	  to	  persuade	  the	  magistrate,	  those	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  emphasized	  the	  facts	  that	  they	  were	  Chinese	  Muslims	  who	  abided	  by	  Confucian	  teachings	  (遵守
儒业，以资正端)	  and	  that	  in	  the	  prayer	  hall	  of	  their	  mosque	  they	  also	  made	  offerings	  to	  the	  tablet	  of	  the	  Emperor	  and	  prayed	  for	  the	  Qing	  Empire.53	  The	  above	  petition	  filed	  by	  the	  Fujian	  gentry	  reflects	  how	  Chinese	  Muslims	  presented	  themselves	  as	  law-­‐abiding	  Qing	  subjects	  and	  made	  use	  of	  their	  state-­‐imposed	  category	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  empire	  and	  win	  support	  of	  Qing	  officials.	  
In	  1879,	  a	  mosque	  in	  Shanghai	  was	  under	  renovation.	  Worried	  about	  being	  bothered	  by	  local	  ruffians	  (guntu	  棍徒)	  and	  their	  construction	  materials	  being	  stolen,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  filed	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  magistrate	  requesting	  official	  protection	  during	  the	  process	  of	  renovation.	  In	  their	  petition,	  the	  local	  gentry	  even	  stated	  that	  the	  mosque	  was	  built	  by	  them	  during	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  QZS,	  163-­‐165.	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Tongzhi	  period	  (1862-­‐1875)	  specially	  for	  making	  offerings	  to	  the	  Imperial	  tablets.54	  	  
Even	  though	  in	  examples	  above,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  expressed	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  imperial	  tablets,	  there	  are	  scholars	  who	  have	  argued	  “when	  Muslims	  prostrated	  themselves	  before	  them	  they	  avoided	  touching	  the	  floor	  with	  their	  head	  and	  so	  invalidated	  the	  rite	  in	  their	  own	  minds.”55	  Records	  of	  Western	  missionaries	  also	  suggest	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  might	  not	  pray	  for	  the	  Qing	  imperial	  family	  in	  actuality,	  but	  a	  tablet	  of	  the	  Emperor	  was	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  being	  accused	  of	  disloyalty.56	  	  	  
Apart	  from	  emphasizing	  their	  sacrificing	  to	  the	  Imperial	  tablets,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  also	  often	  made	  use	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  offered	  free	  schools	  inside	  mosques.	  In	  both	  of	  the	  examples	  above	  where	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  tried	  to	  display	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Qing	  state	  so	  as	  to	  persuade	  local	  officials	  to	  approve	  their	  petition,	  they	  not	  only	  stated	  that	  they	  made	  offerings	  to	  the	  tablet	  of	  the	  Emperor,	  but	  also	  added	  that	  their	  mosques	  also	  offered	  free	  schools	  for	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  children.	  In	  the	  first	  example,	  they	  even	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  a	  Confucian	  school	  (shuguan	  书馆57	  )	  inside	  their	  mosque,	  teaching	  local	  Muslim	  children	  Chinese	  classics.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Shen	  Bao,	  November	  19,	  1879.	  55	  Dillon,	  China’s	  Muslim	  Hui	  Community,	  6.	  56	  Ma	  Jianchun	  and	  Xu	  Hong,	  “Chinese	  mosques	  recorded	  by	  Westerners	  in	  the	  Ming	  and	  Qing	  (Mingqing	  shiqi	  xifang	  ren	  zaiji	  zhong	  de	  zhongguo	  qingzhen	  siyuan	  明清時期西方人载记中的中国
清真寺院),”	  Journal	  of	  Northwest	  University	  for	  Nationalities	  (Philosophy	  and	  Social	  Science)	  (No.4	  2014):	  47-­‐48.	  57	  On	  steles	  erected	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  shuguan	  书馆	  (schools	  of	  books)	  often	  appears	  together	  with	  jingguan	  经馆 (schools	  of	  scriptures).	  The	  former	  refers	  to	  Confucian	  schools	  and	  the	  latter	  refers	  to	  Islamic	  schools.	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Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  educational	  function	  of	  local	  mosques	  when	  trying	  to	  persuade	  Qing	  officials	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Qing’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  ethnic	  discourse	  of	  civilization	  in	  dealing	  with	  affairs	  concerning	  Chinese	  Muslims	  since	  the	  late	  18th	  century.	  From	  the	  late	  18th	  century	  to	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  there	  were	  several	  major	  rebellions	  led	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  northwestern	  China.	  To	  pacify	  those	  areas	  after	  rebellions,	  the	  Qing	  state	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  jiaohua	  教化	  (to	  educate	  and	  to	  civilize).	  Responding	  to	  the	  state	  discourse,	  local	  officials	  in	  northwestern	  China	  established	  many	  free	  schools	  teaching	  Chinese	  classics	  in	  Chinese	  Muslim	  communities	  to	  “educate”	  and	  “civilize”	  them.	  Even	  though	  the	  central	  policy	  of	  civilizing	  Chinese	  Muslims	  was	  only	  formulated	  to	  pacify	  those	  rebellious	  areas,	  judging	  from	  the	  examples	  above,	  clearly	  Qing	  officials	  in	  many	  other	  areas	  of	  China	  proper	  adopted	  the	  same	  attitude	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  who	  were	  more	  educated	  in	  Chinese	  classics	  would	  be	  more	  civilized	  and	  would	  be	  better	  subjects.	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  therefore,	  presented	  themselves	  as	  good	  subjects	  by	  consciously	  emphasizing	  that	  Chinese	  classics	  were	  taught	  in	  jiaofang.	  
In	  1874,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  in	  Henan	  donated	  some	  money	  and	  purchased	  a	  house,	  where	  they	  opened	  an	  Islamic	  school,	  which	  was	  named	  as	  shanyi	  tang	  善义堂	  (the	  Hall	  of	  Kindness	  and	  Righteousness).	  The	  school	  was	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  The	  inner	  part	  was	  an	  Islamic	  school	  (jingxue	  经学)	  open	  for	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  teaching	  Islamic	  scriptures.	  The	  outer	  part	  was	  a	  free	  school	  (yixue	  义学)	  open	  for	  both	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  local	  area,	  teaching	  Confucian	  texts.	  	  A	  highly	  possible	  reason	  for	  having	  the	  outer	  part	  is	  that	  they	  wanted	  their	  school	  to	  appear	  more	  legitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Qing	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officials.	  In	  this	  case,	  preserving	  Chinese	  Muslims’	  religious	  distinction	  was	  obviously	  not	  the	  only	  concern	  of	  those	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  when	  establishing	  the	  school.	  	  
Indeed,	  since	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  after	  all	  different	  from	  the	  majority	  Han	  Chinese	  residents	  in	  China	  proper,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  the	  pressure	  they	  could	  receive	  from	  Qing	  officials	  and	  local	  Han	  Chinese	  residents,	  especially	  in	  regions	  where	  they	  only	  constituted	  a	  very	  small	  minority.	  It	  partly	  explains	  why	  Chinese	  Muslims	  put	  much	  importance	  on	  getting	  official	  protection	  from	  the	  Qing	  government	  when	  it	  was	  possible.	  	  
A	  case	  recorded	  in	  the	  local	  gazetteer	  of	  Ninghe	  during	  the	  Guangxu	  period	  (1874-­‐1908)	  reveals	  how	  much	  pressure	  Chinese	  Muslims	  could	  be	  under.	  During	  the	  Xianfeng	  period	  (1850-­‐1861),	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  Ninghe	  established	  a	  mosque.	  Later,	  the	  mosque	  was	  alleged	  to	  be	  harmful	  to	  local	  
fengshui	  and	  the	  provincial	  official	  ordered	  the	  mosque	  to	  be	  demolished	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  could	  never	  reestablish	  it.	  In	  1979,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  opened	  a	  free	  Islamic	  school.	  Later,	  local	  Han	  Chinese	  gentry	  complained	  that	  it	  was	  indeed	  a	  mosque	  in	  disguise.	  The	  magistrate	  found	  their	  complaint	  credible	  and	  issued	  a	  public	  notice	  prohibiting	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  from	  opening	  free	  schools	  again.58	  In	  the	  gazetteer,	  demolition	  of	  the	  mosque	  was	  even	  recorded	  as	  a	  political	  achievement	  of	  the	  local	  official.59	  	  
These	  examples	  reveal	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  consciously	  made	  use	  of	  their	  state-­‐imposed	  identity	  and	  category	  to	  seek	  official	  protection.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Gazetteer	  of	  the	  Ninghe	  County	  (ninghe	  xianzhi	  宁河县志)	  (1880),	  juan	  3.	  59	  Gazetteer	  of	  the	  Ninghe	  County	  (ninghe	  xianzhi	  宁河县志)	  (1880),	  juan	  9.	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  60	  ZHJL,	  386-­‐388.	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Chapter	  4	  Management	  of	  Jiaofang	  
Leadership	  of	  Mosques	  and	  Jiaofang:	  	  
Regional	  Variations	  and	  Diachronic	  Evolvement	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  a	  regional	  difference	  between	  less	  developed	  rural	  areas	  and	  more	  developed	  areas	  in	  terms	  of	  management	  and	  leadership	  of	  local	  mosques	  and	  jiaofang	  has	  been	  noted.	  In	  remote	  rural	  areas,	  mostly	  in	  western	  part	  of	  China	  proper,	  where	  Islamic	  teachers	  were	  major	  local	  elite,	  mosques	  and	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  were	  usually	  led	  and	  managed	  by	  them.	  Islamic	  teachers	  in	  mosques	  were	  in	  charge	  of	  not	  only	  religious	  matters	  such	  as	  leading	  prayers	  and	  holding	  ceremonies,	  but	  also	  secular	  matters	  such	  as	  managing	  the	  property	  of	  the	  mosques.	  Their	  authority	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  religious	  matters.	  During	  the	  Panthay	  Rebellion	  (1856-­‐1873)	  led	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Yunnan,	  the	  Qing	  state	  relied	  greatly	  on	  local	  Islamic	  teachers	  to	  control	  the	  situation	  and	  maintain	  local	  order.	  
As	  a	  contrast,	  religious	  teachers	  in	  more	  developed	  areas,	  mainly	  in	  eastern	  and	  southeastern	  China,	  had	  much	  less	  power.	  In	  those	  areas,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  actively	  engaged	  in	  local	  affairs,	  and	  they	  also	  managed	  to	  attain	  the	  power	  of	  managing	  local	  mosques.	  One	  important	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  gentry’s	  power	  in	  the	  mosques	  was	  that	  mosques	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  them	  for	  financial	  support.	  In	  those	  areas,	  terms	  like	  gongtian	  公⽥田	  (public	  land)	  and	  
gongchan	  公产	  (public	  property)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐which	  were	  often	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  property	  owned	  by	  auto-­‐organizations	  such	  as	  lineages	  and	  merchant	  associations	  -­‐-­‐-­‐were	  also	  commonly	  seen	  to	  refer	  to	  property	  owned	  by	  mosques,	  or	  to	  be	  precise,	  by	  the	  entire	  jiaofang.	  Property	  was	  also	  managed	  in	  a	  way	  very	  similar	  to	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communal	  property	  of	  other	  secular	  auto-­‐organizations.	  The	  local	  gentry	  selected	  several	  representatives	  as	  managers	  of	  mosques.	  They	  also	  developed	  complex	  rules	  to	  protect	  public	  property	  from	  being	  appropriated	  or	  misused.	  In	  historical	  records	  of	  mosques	  in	  Guangdong	  during	  the	  Qing	  period,	  a	  peculiar	  term	  gongxiang	  公箱	  (public	  coffer)	  was	  often	  seen.	  Donations,	  rents	  of	  public	  houses,	  and	  other	  possible	  income	  of	  the	  mosque	  were	  all	  sent	  to	  gongxiang.	  When	  religious	  ceremonies	  were	  going	  to	  be	  held,	  funds	  were	  withdrawn	  from	  it.	  In	  such	  developed	  areas,	  Islamic	  teachers	  had	  almost	  no	  secular	  power.	  They	  only	  fulfilled	  religious	  responsibilities	  such	  as	  leading	  prayers.	  Even	  the	  selection	  of	  Islamic	  teachers	  lay	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  gentry.	  Sometimes,	  the	  gentry	  selected	  Islamic	  teachers	  from	  local	  Muslims	  who	  were	  deemed	  intellectually	  and	  morally	  qualified.	  They	  also	  at	  times	  employed	  non-­‐native	  Islamic	  teachers.	  
In	  between	  the	  more	  developed	  areas,	  such	  as	  Jiangnan,	  and	  the	  less	  developed	  areas,	  such	  as	  Yunnan,	  there	  were	  also	  some	  regions	  where	  mosques	  were	  managed	  in	  a	  middle	  way.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  village	  in	  Sichuan,	  land	  donated	  in	  1822	  was	  managed	  by	  religious	  teachers	  and	  the	  local	  gentry	  jointly.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  paragraphs,	  two	  case	  studies	  are	  offered	  to	  show	  how	  leadership	  of	  mosques	  and	  jiaofang	  varied	  from	  one	  region	  to	  another	  and	  how	  it	  evolved	  through	  the	  Qing	  period.	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The	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan	  
The	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan	  (济南清真南⼤大寺)	  was	  located	  in	  the	  Licheng	  County,	  Jinan	  Prefecture,	  Shandong	  Province	  in	  Qing	  China.	  On	  steles,	  it	  was	  often	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  the	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  was	  probably	  a	  main,	  if	  not	  the	  biggest,	  mosque	  in	  the	  Jinan	  prefecture.	  The	  mosque	  was	  established	  during	  the	  Yuan	  Dynasty.	  In	  the	  Ming,	  it	  was	  expanded	  greatly	  to	  include	  a	  prayer	  hall,	  a	  fasting	  room,	  an	  Islamic	  school,	  a	  kitchen,	  a	  warehouse	  that	  stored	  funeral	  supplies,	  and	  a	  tower	  named	  jiaohua	  lou	  教化楼	  (Tower	  of	  Educating	  and	  Civilizing)	  or	  wangyue	  lou	  望⽉月楼	  (Tower	  of	  Moon-­‐observing).	  An	  inscription	  in	  1833	  stated	  that	  “its	  palace	  has	  been	  tall	  and	  its	  scale	  has	  been	  grand	  for	  a	  long	  time	  (殿宇⾼高耸，规模宏敞，由来已久).”	  
In	  the	  Qing	  period,	  the	  mosque	  continued	  to	  be	  expanded.	  Islamic	  schools	  affiliated	  to	  the	  mosque	  developed	  into	  two	  separate	  parts	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  a	  school	  for	  children	  (xiaoxue	  ⼩小学)	  and	  a	  school	  for	  advanced	  learners	  (daxue	  ⼤大学).	  There	  were	  also	  three	  different	  sites	  of	  the	  school	  for	  children.	  A	  public	  shower	  room	  was	  also	  built.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  small	  mosque	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan,	  which	  was	  for	  Chinese	  Muslims	  to	  supplement	  their	  prayers.	  One	  site	  of	  the	  Islamic	  school	  for	  children	  was	  also	  inside	  the	  small	  mosque.	  	  
All	  construction	  and	  renovation	  were	  initiated,	  financed,	  and	  overseen	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  the	  local	  jiaofang.	  For	  example,	  in	  1810,	  a	  huge	  and	  tall	  screen	  wall	  was	  built	  between	  the	  prayer	  hall	  and	  the	  front	  door	  of	  the	  mosque.	  It	  was	  initiated	  and	  funded	  by	  a	  group	  of	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  working	  in	  the	  Changshun	  grain	  shop	  (changshun	  lianghang	  长顺粮⾏行).	  One	  site	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of	  the	  school	  for	  children	  was	  financed	  by	  the	  wife	  of	  Jin	  Baofu	  ⾦金宝符	  -­‐-­‐-­‐a	  renowned	  member	  of	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  who	  was	  very	  active	  in	  local	  affairs.	  In	  1874,	  the	  entire	  mosque,	  including	  the	  Islamic	  schools,	  was	  under	  a	  large-­‐scale	  project	  of	  renovation,	  which	  was	  entirely	  supported	  by	  funds	  raised	  from	  the	  jiaofang.	  Apart	  from	  donating	  money	  for	  renovation,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  also	  donated	  their	  property	  to	  the	  mosque	  for	  daily	  maintenance,	  such	  as	  providing	  expenses	  for	  the	  shower	  room	  and	  stipends	  for	  Islamic	  teachers.	  
As	  Benite	  discusses	  in	  his	  book,	  Shandong	  was	  one	  of	  the	  centers	  of	  the	  Islamic	  revival	  in	  the	  late	  Ming	  and	  early	  Qing	  period,	  and	  Chinese	  Muslims	  from	  all	  over	  China	  proper	  went	  to	  visit	  and	  study	  there.61	  Steles	  indeed	  reveal	  that	  the	  Southern	  Mosque	  was	  large	  in	  scale	  and	  managed	  in	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  way	  than	  common	  mosques.	  In	  as	  early	  as	  1715,	  a	  stele	  in	  the	  mosque	  already	  clearly	  prohibited	  Islamic	  teachers	  from	  passing	  their	  positions	  to	  their	  sons,	  which	  only	  started	  to	  concern	  the	  mosque	  in	  the	  Wu	  County	  in	  Jiangsu	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century.62	  Such	  a	  stele	  not	  only	  reveals	  the	  advanced	  level	  of	  management	  of	  the	  mosque,	  but	  also	  betrays	  the	  limited	  power	  enjoyed	  by	  Islamic	  teachers	  in	  the	  local	  jiaofang.	  	  
In	  1737,	  a	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  woman	  donated	  money	  to	  renovate	  the	  Tower.	  The	  stele	  recording	  the	  donation	  shows	  that	  it	  was	  received	  by	  Islamic	  teachers	  of	  the	  mosque.	  The	  author	  and	  calligrapher	  of	  the	  inscription	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  Islamic	  teachers	  rather	  than	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry.63	  It	  reflects	  that	  in	  1737,	  Islamic	  teachers	  still	  had	  power	  of	  managing	  the	  mosque	  property	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Benite,	  The	  Dao	  of	  Muhammad,	  49-­‐51.	  62	  JYB,	  16-­‐17.	  63	  JYB,	  70-­‐71.	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and	  their	  intellectual	  influence	  beyond	  religious	  aspects	  was	  recognized	  by	  the	  
jiaofang.	  	  
The	  situation	  changed	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  At	  the	  bottom	  of	  a	  stele	  in	  1810	  which	  recorded	  renovation	  of	  the	  mosque,	  besides	  the	  names	  of	  the	  Islamic	  teachers,	  a	  new	  title	  also	  appeared	  -­‐-­‐-­‐lingxiu	  xianglao	  领袖乡⽼老	  (the	  leading	  local	  elder).	  The	  title	  was	  filled	  by	  a	  juren	  举⼈人	  (a	  degree	  holder	  of	  the	  second/provincial-­‐level	  civil	  service	  examination).64	  It	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  began	  to	  participate	  in	  managing	  the	  mosque.	  	  
In	  1845,	  on	  a	  stele	  recording	  a	  donation	  activity,	  which	  also	  served	  as	  a	  title	  deed	  of	  the	  donated	  property,	  receivers	  of	  the	  property	  were	  written	  as	  three	  Islamic	  teachers	  and	  twelve	  managers	  (shoushiren	  ⾸首事⼈人).65	  Compared	  with	  lingxiu	  xianglao	  (the	  leading	  local	  elder),	  this	  new	  title	  -­‐-­‐-­‐manager	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  suggests	  the	  formal	  involvement	  of	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  mosque.	  In	  1874,	  on	  the	  stele	  recording	  the	  renovation	  of	  Islamic	  schools,	  names	  of	  Islamic	  teachers	  were	  not	  even	  seen.66	  	  
The	  title	  of	  the	  manager	  and	  that	  of	  the	  local	  elders	  were	  used	  interchangeably	  on	  steles	  after	  1845.	  Since	  1872,	  the	  local	  elders	  (or	  managers)	  appearing	  on	  steles	  were	  limited	  to	  a	  specific	  number,	  sometimes	  four,	  six	  or	  eight.	  And	  some	  names	  appeared	  repetitively.	  For	  example,	  Fan	  Changqing	  范长
清	  was	  recorded	  on	  steles	  as	  a	  member	  of	  “the	  local	  elders”	  from	  1872	  till	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  JYB,	  20-­‐21.	  65	  JYB,	  28-­‐29.	  66	  JYB,	  38-­‐39.	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1890.67	  Some	  members	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  who	  were	  active	  participants	  in	  the	  local	  jiaofang	  -­‐-­‐-­‐common	  donors	  of	  the	  mosque,	  and	  common	  authors	  and	  calligraphers	  of	  steles	  inside	  the	  mosque	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  were	  also	  members	  of	  the	  group	  of	  “local	  elders”	  or	  “managers”	  such	  as	  Zuo	  Fengsheng	  左凤盛	  and	  Ma	  Bingzhang	  马
炳章.	  Arguably,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  who	  were	  powerful	  and	  active	  in	  local	  affairs	  both	  participated	  in	  and	  led	  the	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  public.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  power	  of	  Islamic	  teachers	  in	  the	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan	  was	  limited.	  No	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  they	  were	  involved	  in	  any	  fund-­‐raising	  activities	  for	  the	  mosque.	  They	  were	  sometimes	  not	  even	  natives	  of	  the	  jiaofang	  but	  were	  employed	  by	  the	  local	  gentry	  due	  to	  their	  fame	  and	  intellectual	  achievements.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  Islamic	  teachers	  was	  still	  respected	  in	  affairs	  of	  mosque	  management.	  At	  the	  bottom	  of	  steles	  recording	  donation	  or	  renovation,	  names	  of	  Islamic	  teachers	  were	  generally	  inscribed	  before	  those	  of	  the	  local	  elders,	  even	  though	  the	  local	  elders	  were	  the	  actual	  receivers	  and	  managers	  of	  donation.	  The	  circumstance	  was	  very	  different	  in	  Guangzhou.	  	  
	  
The	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  of	  Guangzhou	  
The	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  of	  Guangzhou	  (⼴广州怀圣寺)	  located	  in	  the	  Guangzhou	  Prefecture,	  Guangdong	  Province	  was	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  mosques	  in	  China.	  It	  was	  built	  in	  the	  Tang	  dynasty	  by	  Arab	  merchants	  trading	  in	  Guangzhou.	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Until	  the	  Qing	  period,	  it	  was	  still	  the	  leading	  mosque	  in	  Guangzhou.	  The	  public	  culture	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangzhou	  was	  highly	  active	  (if	  not	  the	  most	  active	  in	  China	  proper).	  As	  early	  as	  1718,	  an	  autonomous	  mutual-­‐help	  group	  was	  formed	  by	  a	  group	  of	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  elders	  to	  support	  each	  other’s	  funeral.	  In	  1762,	  their	  children	  donated	  their	  remaining	  communal	  property	  to	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  and	  the	  Haopan	  Mosque	  (濠畔寺)	  for	  “public”	  use	  only.	  	  
It	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  a	  tradition	  in	  Guangzhou	  that	  during	  each	  time	  of	  renovation,	  names	  of	  all	  donors	  contributing	  to	  renovation	  would	  be	  inscribed	  on	  steles.	  It	  was	  also	  seen	  in	  some	  other	  regions,	  such	  as	  Sichuan,	  but	  the	  number	  of	  names	  (at	  most	  fifty)	  was	  much	  fewer	  than	  those	  on	  steles	  in	  Guangzhou.	  In	  1871,	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  was	  under	  a	  large	  renovation	  project.	  Two	  steles	  were	  used	  to	  record	  all	  donors	  (approximately	  500)	  to	  this	  activity.	  The	  name	  list	  started	  with	  officials	  and	  military	  officers	  who	  contributed	  their	  money.	  A	  name	  list	  of	  foreign	  donors	  (mostly	  Arabs)	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  followed.	  After	  the	  two	  lists,	  donors	  from	  the	  local	  and	  all	  neighboring	  jiaofang	  were	  listed	  one	  by	  one,	  including	  Chinese	  Muslims	  from	  the	  Haopan	  Mosque,	  those	  from	  the	  Nansheng	  Mosque	  (南胜寺),	  those	  from	  the	  Dongying	  Mosque	  (东营寺),	  those	  from	  the	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  Zhaoqing	  Mosque	  (东/西肇庆寺),	  and,	  finally,	  those	  from	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque.	  These	  donors	  from	  the	  local	  and	  nearby	  
jiaofang	  were	  recorded	  mostly	  as	  individuals.	  Sometimes	  a	  place	  name	  was	  put	  next	  to	  their	  names,	  such	  as	  Shaanxi,	  Shandong,	  Yunnan,	  or	  Sichuan,	  indicating	  that	  the	  person	  was	  a	  sojourning	  Chinese	  Muslim.	  There	  were	  also	  bannermen	  participating	  in	  donation.	  At	  times,	  names	  of	  shops	  or	  auto-­‐organizations	  were	  recorded	  as	  donors,	  such	  as	  guiri	  tang	  贵⽇日堂	  and	  jingzhen	  zhai	  敬真斋.	  Further	  
	   49	  
research	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  determine	  which	  kind	  of	  organizations	  they	  were.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  also	  made	  donation	  as	  households.	  For	  example,	  there	  were	  names	  such	  as	  yangdazhai	  杨⼤大宅	  (the	  first	  household	  of	  the	  Yangs),	  yangsanzhai	  
杨三宅	  (the	  third	  household	  of	  the	  Yangs),	  and	  lindazhai	  林⼤大宅	  (the	  first	  household	  of	  the	  Lins).68	  	  
Like	  the	  Southern	  Mosque	  of	  Jinan,	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  of	  Guangzhou	  was	  also	  under	  systematic	  management.	  Steles	  show	  that,	  in	  1770,	  title	  deeds	  of	  property	  donated	  to	  the	  mosque	  were	  still	  kept	  by	  Islamic	  teachers	  who	  led	  the	  mosque	  (zhangjiao	  掌教,	  religious	  leaders).69	  In	  1779,	  the	  title	  of	  “manager”	  (zhishi	  执事)	  emerged.	  Property	  of	  the	  mosque	  was	  handled	  by	  managers	  by	  turns	  (轮流⽀支理).	  The	  position	  of	  the	  manager	  continued	  to	  exist	  through	  the	  Qing	  period.	  Those	  managers	  were	  a	  group	  of	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  elites	  (basically	  the	  gentry	  and	  merchants).	  Each	  year,	  generally	  two	  of	  them	  would	  be	  managers,	  called	  “managers	  of	  the	  year”	  (dangnian	  zhishi	  当年执事).	  Those	  elites	  took	  turns	  as	  managers	  of	  the	  year.	  There	  were	  also	  deputy	  managers	  (fuzuo	  
zhishi	  副佐执事).	  After	  managers	  emerged,	  the	  title	  of	  zhangjiao	  掌教	  (religious	  leaders)	  was	  seldom	  seen	  on	  steles.	  Their	  names	  never	  showed	  up	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  steles.	  They	  were	  also	  rarely	  mentioned	  in	  inscriptions.	  	  
One	  characteristic	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  was	  the	  existence	  of	  “public	  coffers”	  (gongxiang	  公箱).	  In	  1848,	  37	  managers	  of	  the	  mosque	  contributed	  their	  money	  and	  bought	  a	  shop.	  The	  rent	  of	  each	  month	  was	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stored	  in	  the	  “public	  coffer”	  of	  the	  mosque	  (bensi	  gongxiang	  本寺公箱)	  and	  taken	  care	  of	  by	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  year.	  The	  money	  was	  used	  for	  celebrating	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Prophet’s	  ascension	  (Lailat	  al	  Mi'raj)	  each	  year.	  When	  there	  was	  money	  left	  over,	  it	  was	  deposited	  into	  another	  “public	  coffer”	  and	  saved	  for	  renovating	  the	  shop.70	  Judging	  from	  this	  example,	  a	  “public	  coffer”	  resembled	  a	  public	  account.	  	  
Another	  unique	  feature	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  was	  that	  it	  also	  belonged	  to	  a	  unified	  system	  which	  connected	  four	  neighboring	  
jiaofang	  and	  their	  mosques	  in	  Guangzhou.	  The	  four	  mosques	  were	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque,	  the	  Haopan	  Mosque,	  the	  Nansheng	  Mosque,	  and	  the	  Dongying	  Mosque.	  They	  firstly	  appeared	  together	  on	  a	  stele	  in	  1770	  when	  a	  person	  divided	  his	  property	  evenly	  into	  four	  parts	  and	  donated	  it	  to	  each	  of	  the	  four	  mosques.71	  In	  1779,	  a	  group	  of	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  bought	  a	  house	  together	  and	  donated	  it	  to	  the	  four	  mosques.	  This	  time	  the	  donors	  did	  not	  divide	  their	  property.	  Rather,	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  four	  mosques	  were	  asked	  to	  care	  for	  it	  by	  turns.	  It	  suggests	  that	  a	  system	  of	  rotation	  was	  created	  to	  include	  managers	  of	  the	  four	  mosques.	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  person	  sold	  his	  house	  to	  the	  four	  mosques	  (出买[卖]与四寺公
众管业).72	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  four	  mosques	  worked	  as	  one	  unified	  economic	  enterprise	  with	  collectively	  owned	  property.	  	  
Another	  piece	  of	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  formal	  connection	  of	  the	  four	  mosques	  was	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  public	  coffer	  owned	  by	  the	  four	  jiaofang	  jointly	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(sifang	  gongxiang	  四⽅方/坊公箱).	  In	  1813,	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  four	  mosques	  turned	  a	  donated	  house	  into	  a	  shop.	  On	  the	  stele,	  it	  stated	  that	  because	  at	  that	  time	  there	  was	  no	  remaining	  money	  in	  the	  joint	  coffer	  of	  the	  four	  jiaofang,	  a	  manager	  named	  Liang	  亮	  contributed	  his	  own	  money	  to	  the	  renovation.73	  Judging	  by	  this	  example,	  a	  joint	  account	  of	  the	  four	  jiaofang	  had	  already	  emerged	  in	  1813.	  After	  1813,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  donations	  were	  made	  directly	  to	  the	  joint	  coffer,	  which	  was	  attended	  to	  by	  managers	  of	  each	  of	  the	  four	  mosques	  by	  turns.	  	  
The	  emergence	  of	  the	  joint	  coffer	  of	  the	  four	  jiaofang	  did	  not	  make	  public	  coffers	  of	  individual	  mosques	  disappear.	  In	  1848,	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque	  still	  donated	  property	  to	  the	  public	  coffer	  of	  the	  Huaisheng	  Mosque.74	  When	  individual	  donors	  made	  a	  donation,	  they	  could	  choose	  to	  donate	  their	  property	  either	  to	  a	  specific	  mosque	  or	  the	  joint	  coffer	  of	  the	  four	  jiaofang.	  For	  example,	  in	  1841,	  a	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  in	  Guangzhou,	  after	  seeing	  many	  people	  donate	  their	  property	  to	  the	  joint	  coffer	  of	  the	  four	  jiaofang,	  wanted	  to	  follow	  their	  example,	  so	  he	  decided	  to	  donate	  his	  property	  to	  the	  Islamic	  shrine	  of	  Guangzhou.75	  	  
This	  way	  of	  managing	  public	  property	  through	  “public	  coffers”	  was	  not	  a	  unique	  feature	  of	  mosques.	  In	  local	  gazetteers	  of	  Qing	  China,	  the	  term	  “public	  coffer”	  was	  also	  found	  in	  the	  gazetteer	  of	  the	  Fanyu	  County,	  the	  Nanhai	  County,	  and	  the	  Shunde	  County	  of	  Guangdong.	  In	  those	  records,	  “public	  coffers”	  was	  mentioned	  in	  the	  management	  of	  various	  social	  groups	  such	  as	  public	  schools	  (⾢邑学)	  and	  literati	  groups	  (⽂文社)	  in	  which	  the	  main	  participants	  were	  Han	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Chinese.	  Apparently,	  religious	  publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangzhou	  were	  managed	  in	  a	  way	  not	  so	  different	  from	  how	  Han	  Chinese	  in	  Guangdong	  managed	  their	  auto-­‐organizations.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  and	  Han	  Chinese	  in	  Guangzhou	  shared	  a	  common	  public	  culture.	  	  
	  
Conflicts	  and	  Creation	  of	  Customary	  Law	  
	   Chapter	  3	  demonstrates	  the	  mosques’	  loss	  of	  judicial	  functions	  and	  legal	  authority	  in	  the	  local	  jiaofang.	  In	  Qing	  China,	  there	  were	  no	  longer	  Islamic	  judges	  in	  mosques	  dealing	  with	  conflicts	  and	  legal	  affairs	  of	  the	  jiaofang.	  How	  did	  Chinese	  Muslims	  settle	  their	  conflicts	  in	  managing	  their	  publics?	  Scholars	  studying	  laws	  and	  legal	  cases	  in	  the	  Qing	  such	  as	  Philip	  Huang	  and	  Liang	  Zhiping	  have	  noticed	  some	  different	  approaches	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  communities	  to	  settling	  conflicts.	  In	  many	  civil	  cases	  dealing	  with	  issues	  such	  as	  property	  ownership	  and	  inheritance,	  local	  magistrates	  were	  often	  happy	  to	  leave	  them	  to	  “extrajudicial	  community/kin	  mediation.”	  It	  was	  also	  common,	  though,	  for	  even	  “simple	  peasants”	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  Qing	  courts	  and	  lodge	  lawsuits	  for	  settlement	  of	  disputes.76	  Various	  publics	  also	  attended	  to	  internal	  disputes	  with	  agreed-­‐upon	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  To	  enhance	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  rules	  or	  agreements,	  they	  also	  often	  sent	  them	  to	  local	  governments	  for	  official	  registration	  or	  recognition.	  Such	  practices,	  as	  Liang	  argues,	  formed	  the	  “customary	  law”	  in	  Qing	  China,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  regional	  rules	  developed	  by	  local	  residents	  for	  distribution	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations	  and	  for	  settlement	  of	  disputes,	  and	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enforced	  in	  social	  networks.77	  Historical	  evidence	  shows	  that	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  created	  local	  customary	  law,	  just	  like	  Han	  Chinese	  publics.	  
Conflicts	  and	  problems	  in	  management	  of	  mosques	  and	  jiaofang	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  problems	  arising	  when	  managing	  auto-­‐organizations	  such	  as	  lineages,	  literati	  groups,	  and	  merchant	  associations.	  Large	  numbers	  of	  conflicts	  centered	  on	  economic	  issues,	  such	  as	  appropriation	  of	  public	  land	  and	  selling	  public	  property	  in	  secret.	  Common	  possible	  conflicts	  were	  reflected	  in	  a	  set	  of	  regulations	  of	  a	  mosque	  in	  Hunan	  in	  1877.	  The	  following	  are	  specific	  rules	  related	  to	  possible	  conflicts:	  
Sixth,	  local	  Muslims	  or	  people	  with	  spouses	  and	  children	  may	  not	  be	  guards	  of	  the	  mosque.	  Only	  non-­‐natives	  who	  are	  single	  can	  be	  guards.	  
Seventh,	  spaces	  of	  the	  mosque	  may	  not	  be	  lent	  to	  craftsmen	  for	  working…	  
Ninth,	  furniture,	  tableware,	  lights	  and	  decorations	  of	  the	  mosque	  may	  not	  be	  lent	  to	  people	  holding	  banquets…	  
Fifteenth,	  during	  holy	  days,	  beef	  may	  not	  be	  sold	  outside…	  
Seventeenth,	  land	  and	  houses	  of	  the	  mosque	  and	  the	  community	  are	  available	  for	  renting…	  They	  may	  not	  be	  appropriated.	  
Eighteenth,	  managers	  of	  the	  mosque	  should	  be	  clear	  when	  keeping	  accounts.	  They	  may	  not	  manipulate	  accounts	  and	  embezzle	  money.	  If	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there	  is	  extra	  money,	  the	  community	  can	  decide	  whether	  to	  purchase	  more	  property.78	  	  	  
The	  above	  rules	  reveal	  that	  the	  space,	  buildings,	  and	  property	  of	  the	  mosque	  were	  all	  deemed	  public	  property	  of	  the	  jiaofang.	  Usage	  of	  public	  property	  should	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  entire	  jiaofang.	  Any	  possible	  threats	  to	  public	  property,	  such	  as	  guards	  who	  had	  access	  to	  property	  inside	  the	  mosque,	  were	  under	  agreed-­‐upon	  regulations.	  	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  often	  sent	  their	  rules	  to	  local	  government	  to	  enhance	  the	  authority	  of	  those	  rules.	  In	  1886,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Jilin	  proposed	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  property	  of	  their	  mosque,	  and	  they	  petitioned	  the	  local	  government	  for	  an	  official	  registration	  of	  their	  activities	  and	  their	  rules.	  Twelve	  years	  later,	  due	  to	  poor	  management,	  corporate	  land	  was	  either	  taken	  back	  by	  donors	  or	  appropriated.	  Local	  Chinese	  Muslims	  decided	  that,	  since	  they	  had	  an	  old	  set	  of	  rules	  which	  were	  officially	  registered,	  they	  should	  again	  follow	  those	  rules	  to	  rearrange	  their	  pubic	  property.	  They	  also	  invited	  local	  officials	  to	  be	  eyewitnesses	  when	  they	  recreated	  title	  deeds	  of	  the	  property.79	  	  	  
Similarly,	  in	  1843,	  public	  land	  of	  the	  Mosque	  of	  the	  Dang	  Village	  in	  Shandong	  was	  occupied	  by	  two	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  Residents	  of	  the	  entire	  village	  filed	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  local	  magistrate	  who	  later	  gave	  his	  verdict	  that	  the	  two	  Chinese	  Muslims	  must	  return	  the	  land	  and	  should	  not	  make	  trouble.	  After	  the	  affair,	  in	  1844,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  elites	  of	  the	  village	  had	  a	  public	  discussion	  (gongyi	  公议)	  and	  they	  formulated	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  stating	  that	  Islamic	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teachers	  should	  not	  pass	  their	  positions	  to	  their	  sons,	  let	  unknown	  people	  stay	  in	  the	  mosque,	  or	  sell	  public	  property	  of	  the	  mosque	  privately.	  If	  Islamic	  teachers	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  rules,	  all	  residents	  of	  the	  village	  would	  discuss	  publicly	  and	  select	  new	  teachers.	  Worried	  about	  unpredictable	  situations	  such	  as	  the	  previous	  trouble,	  the	  village	  petitioned	  the	  local	  magistrate	  for	  registration	  of	  their	  rules	  and	  also	  requested	  that	  the	  magistrate	  issue	  an	  official	  notice	  that	  all	  residents	  of	  the	  village	  should	  follow	  the	  rules	  and	  that	  those	  who	  violated	  them	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  court	  and	  punished	  by	  law	  (按法究治).80	  The	  statement	  that	  people	  who	  violated	  rules	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Muslim	  public	  would	  be	  punished	  by	  law	  reflects	  the	  actual	  legal	  authority	  of	  those	  rules	  formed	  outside	  the	  state	  legal	  system.	  It	  reveals	  how	  rules	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  and	  laws	  of	  the	  state	  cooperated	  in	  dealing	  with	  local	  disputes.	  	  
The	  above	  example	  also	  shows	  that	  economic	  disputes	  in	  jiaofang	  were	  often	  closely	  related	  to	  conflicts	  over	  mosque	  leadership.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  mosques	  in	  China	  proper	  were	  often	  not	  led	  by	  Islamic	  teachers	  who	  had	  religious	  authority,	  but	  the	  local	  gentry	  who	  held	  economic	  and	  social	  power.	  Sometimes	  Islamic	  teachers	  tried	  to	  keep	  and	  expand	  their	  authority	  by	  passing	  their	  positions	  to	  their	  own	  children,	  while	  the	  local	  gentry	  were	  against	  such	  hereditary	  practices	  and	  claimed	  that	  religious	  teachers	  should	  be	  selected	  by	  them.	  When	  actual	  power	  conflicts	  arose,	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  often	  resorted	  to	  Qing	  officials	  for	  settlement.	  In	  an	  aforementioned	  example,	  the	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  in	  the	  Wu	  County,	  Jiangsu	  petitioned	  the	  local	  magistrate	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in	  1881	  regarding	  the	  hereditary	  practices	  of	  those	  Islamic	  teachers	  in	  their	  local	  mosque.81	  	  	  
Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  not	  only	  Muslims	  but	  also	  degree	  holders	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  examination.	  Their	  authority	  and	  influence	  in	  local	  areas	  came	  from	  their	  status	  as	  members	  of	  the	  gentry.	  In	  this	  sense,	  there	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  when	  attending	  to	  local	  disputes,	  they	  adopted	  their	  identity	  as	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  and	  worked	  with	  local	  governments,	  just	  like	  Han	  Chinese	  gentry.	  However,	  even	  when	  there	  were	  no	  conflicts	  over	  leadership	  between	  Islamic	  teachers	  and	  local	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry,	  and	  mosques	  were	  entirely	  led	  by	  Islamic	  teachers,	  Islamic	  teachers	  also	  chose	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  Qing	  government	  for	  official	  recognition	  of	  mosque	  rules.	  In	  an	  earlier	  example,	  an	  Islamic	  teacher	  in	  Henan	  petitioned	  the	  local	  magistrate	  in	  1784.	  At	  that	  time,	  he	  was	  nearing	  70	  years	  old	  and	  worried	  that	  the	  Islamic	  teachers	  who	  would	  take	  his	  position	  could	  not	  follow	  the	  old	  rules	  and	  traditions	  of	  the	  mosque	  that	  had	  been	  kept	  since	  the	  Tang	  dynasty.	  He	  then	  filed	  a	  petition	  with	  the	  local	  magistrate	  and	  requested	  him	  to	  officially	  recognize	  those	  old	  traditions.82	  
These	  examples	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  religious	  publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  faced	  disputes	  similar	  to	  those	  faced	  by	  secular	  publics,	  such	  as	  lineages	  and	  merchant	  associations.	  They	  also	  settled	  those	  disputes	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  formulating	  agreed-­‐upon	  rules	  and	  sometimes	  seeking	  official	  recognition.	  Through	  petitions	  to	  the	  Qing	  government,	  rules	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslim	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Chapter	  5	  Multiple	  Identities	  and	  Overlapping	  Publics	  
	   The	  many	  examples	  described	  above	  demonstrate	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  had	  multiple	  identities.	  Their	  identities	  came	  from	  their	  religious	  affiliation,	  region,	  and	  occupation,	  etc.	  Even	  in	  participating	  in	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  jiaofang,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  might	  adopt	  non-­‐religious	  identities	  such	  as	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  and	  law-­‐abiding	  Qing	  subjects	  when	  expedient.	  Most	  of	  the	  time,	  there	  was	  no	  choice	  to	  be	  made	  between	  being	  a	  Muslim	  or	  a	  Chinese,	  for	  an	  identity	  like	  a	  member	  of	  the	  gentry	  was	  not	  an	  exclusively	  Han	  Chinese	  identity.	  There	  was	  never	  a	  real	  dichotomy	  between	  “Chineseness”	  and	  “Muslimness,”	  nor	  was	  there	  a	  “simultaneity”	  of	  the	  two,	  as	  Benite	  argues,83	  which	  still	  presupposes	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  them.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  had	  multiple	  identities	  and	  were	  involved	  in	  overlapping	  publics.	  They	  consciously	  adopted	  certain	  identities	  when	  participating	  in	  and	  forming	  various	  publics.	  	  
For	  instance,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  generally	  also	  organized	  themselves	  into	  lineages.	  They	  built	  ancestral	  halls,	  composed	  genealogies,	  ran	  public	  land	  and	  property	  of	  their	  lineages,	  and	  formulated	  rules	  regarding	  ancestor	  worship	  and	  lineage	  management.	  When	  participating	  in	  activities	  of	  their	  lineages,	  they	  sometimes	  did	  not	  invoke	  their	  religious	  identity.	  During	  the	  1880s,	  two	  publics	  -­‐-­‐-­‐beili	  yuying	  hui	  北李育婴会	  (Infant	  Center	  of	  the	  Northern	  Li)	  and	  nanli	  yuying	  
hui 南李救婴会	  (Infant	  Center	  of	  the	  Southern	  Li)-­‐-­‐-­‐	  were	  established	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Taojiang	  County,	  Hunan	  to	  support	  local	  newborn	  infants	  financially,	  especially	  to	  prevent	  the	  practice	  of	  killing	  female	  infants.	  The	  two	  publics	  were	  sub-­‐organizations	  under	  the	  Li	  lineage	  of	  the	  county.	  Members	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Benite,	  The	  Dao	  of	  Muhammad.	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the	  publics	  were	  viewed	  not	  primarily	  as	  Muslims	  but	  as	  descendants	  of	  the	  Li	  family.	  Public	  meetings	  were	  also	  held	  in	  the	  ancestral	  hall	  of	  the	  Li	  lineage.84	  	  	  
There	  were	  also	  cases	  in	  which	  Chinese	  Muslims	  simultaneously	  invoked	  their	  religious	  and	  familial	  identities.	  This	  was	  commonly	  seen	  in	  some	  rural	  areas	  where	  residents	  of	  a	  village	  belonged	  to	  the	  same	  lineage	  as	  well	  as	  the	  same	  jiaofang.	  For	  example,	  in	  1708,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  the	  Cui	  Village	  in	  Shandong	  re-­‐built	  their	  mosque.	  On	  the	  stele	  recording	  the	  event,	  terms	  of	  zuren	  
族⼈人	  (members	  of	  the	  lineage)	  and	  jiaomin	  教民	  (adherents	  of	  the	  religion)	  were	  used	  interchangeably.	  For	  instance,	  in	  one	  single	  statement	  -­‐-­‐-­‐“With	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  entire	  lineage,	  the	  project	  was	  finished	  in	  autumn.	  The	  wish	  of	  us	  adherents	  of	  Islam	  was	  fulfilled.	  The	  power	  and	  influence	  of	  our	  village	  and	  our	  lineage	  were	  also	  promoted.”	  (经族⼈人合⼒力，⾄至秋告竣，以结教民⼼心愿，振庄族之威)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  the	  Cui	  village	  simultaneously	  identified	  themselves	  as	  members	  of	  the	  Cui	  lineage,	  adherents	  of	  Islam,	  and	  residents	  of	  the	  village.85	  Their	  public	  was	  simultaneously	  a	  lineage,	  a	  jiaofang,	  and	  a	  village.	  In	  the	  activity	  of	  rebuilding	  the	  mosque	  of	  the	  Cui	  Village,	  the	  three	  identities	  were	  all	  invoked	  and	  no	  one	  identity	  was	  more	  prominent	  than	  the	  others.	  	  
Another	  popular	  form	  of	  publics	  among	  Chinese	  Muslims	  was	  the	  merchant	  association.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  attained	  fame	  as	  successful	  merchants,	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Hui	  caravans	  in	  northwestern	  China	  and	  in	  Yunnan.	  When	  traveling	  for	  trade,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  usually	  engaged	  in	  different	  merchant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Ma	  Jianli,	  Selected	  Records	  on	  Social	  Organizations	  in	  Southern	  China	  (Zhongguo	  nanfang	  huizu	  
shehui	  tuanti	  ziliao	  xuanbian	  中国南方回族社会团体资料选编)	  (Sichuan:	  Sichuan	  Nationalities	  Press,	  2003),	  103.	  85	  JYB,	  244.	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associations	  with	  a	  combined	  identity	  of	  religion	  and	  region.	  For	  example,	  Muslims	  who	  regularly	  prayed	  in	  the	  Lianhuajie	  Mosque	  in	  Xiangtan,	  Hunan	  were	  not	  only	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims,	  but	  also	  members	  of	  the	  Jiangnan	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  association	  and	  the	  Henan	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  association.	  In	  1892,	  when	  a	  conflict	  arose	  over	  mosque	  management,	  the	  two	  merchant	  associations	  were	  invited	  to	  discuss	  the	  issue	  together	  with	  local	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  They	  worked	  together	  and	  came	  up	  with	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  property.86	  	  This	  case	  indicates	  that	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  might	  organize	  themselves	  by	  religion	  as	  well	  as	  region.	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchants	  from	  Jiangnan	  and	  those	  from	  Henan	  belonged	  to	  different	  publics.	  	  
Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  publics	  often	  excluded	  other	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  one	  region	  were	  not	  necessarily	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  privileges	  or	  property	  with	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  another	  region	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  common	  religious	  identity.	  In	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  a	  group	  of	  Muslim	  merchants	  who	  were	  from	  Jiangning	  and	  trading	  in	  Hankou	  bought	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  free	  cemetery	  for	  all	  Jiangning	  Muslim	  merchants	  trading	  in	  Hankou.	  Later,	  they	  found	  out	  that	  some	  local	  residents	  had	  secretly	  buried	  family	  members	  in	  the	  land.	  They	  then	  petitioned	  the	  local	  government	  requesting	  an	  official	  notice	  prohibiting	  such	  practices,	  stating	  that	  the	  land	  was	  specially	  bought	  for	  Jiangning	  Muslim	  merchants	  in	  Hankou,	  and	  even	  local	  Hankou	  Muslims	  could	  not	  appropriate	  it.87	  This	  example	  shows	  that	  various	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  QZS,	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factors	  such	  as	  economic	  interests	  could	  make	  Chinese	  Muslims	  leave	  aside	  their	  common	  religious	  bond.	  	  
	   Economic	  interests	  could	  separate	  Chinese	  Muslims	  from	  different	  regions,	  and	  they	  could	  also	  drive	  Chinese	  Muslims	  to	  invoke	  their	  common	  religious	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  cooperate.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  book	  on	  the	  ethnogenesis	  of	  the	  Hui	  nationality,	  Gladney	  offered	  an	  example	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  communities	  near	  the	  Liu	  Pan	  range	  in	  Ningxia	  who	  fled	  or	  were	  forcibly	  relocated	  there	  after	  the	  Shaanxi	  Hui	  Rebellion	  (1862-­‐1877).	  They	  belonged	  to	  disparate	  menhuan	  (the	  Chinese	  form	  of	  Sufi	  orders),	  which	  were	  extremely	  exclusive	  groups	  and	  often	  had	  severely	  violent	  conflicts.	  But	  after	  being	  forced	  to	  move	  away	  from	  their	  local	  communities,	  they	  invoked	  their	  “sense	  of	  a	  common	  religious	  heritage”	  to	  connect	  with	  each	  other	  so	  as	  to	  build	  a	  trading	  network.88	  	  
	   Since	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  were	  involved	  in	  various	  overlapping	  publics,	  mosques	  sometimes	  served	  as	  not	  only	  public	  venues	  of	  local	  jiaofang	  but	  also	  public	  venues	  of	  other	  publics	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslims.	  For	  example,	  in	  1911,	  the	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  association	  of	  Shanghai	  held	  its	  public	  meetings	  inside	  the	  local	  mosque.89	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Chapter	  6	  Conclusion	  
	  Examination	  of	  the	  public	  culture	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  shows	  that	  they	  participated	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  publics	  based	  on	  various	  common	  bonds	  they	  could	  invoke	  such	  as	  religion,	  place	  of	  origin,	  kinship,	  economic	  interests,	  and	  occupation.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  had	  their	  unique	  religious	  publics	  exclusive	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  -­‐-­‐-­‐the	  Ummah	  and	  jiaofang.	  They	  also	  formed	  publics	  which	  Han	  Chinese	  commonly	  organized	  themselves	  into	  and	  in	  which	  they	  sometimes	  did	  not	  invoke	  their	  religious	  identity,	  such	  as	  lineages	  and	  merchant	  associations.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  were	  involved	  in	  those	  multiple	  and	  overlapping	  publics	  in	  their	  daily	  life.	  These	  two	  types	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  religious	  publics	  were	  only	  part	  of	  the	  publics	  in	  which	  they	  participated,	  and	  did	  not	  go	  against	  or	  hinder	  their	  participation	  in	  other	  publics,	  many	  of	  which	  they	  actually	  shared	  with	  Han	  Chinese.	  	  
Whether	  it	  was	  a	  jiaofang,	  a	  lineage,	  or	  a	  merchant	  association,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  participated,	  managed	  and	  regulated	  their	  publics	  in	  ways	  no	  different	  from	  their	  Han	  Chinese	  neighbors.	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  faced	  disputes	  similar	  to	  those	  faced	  by	  Han	  Chinese	  publics.	  They	  also	  settled	  those	  disputes	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  formulating	  agreed-­‐upon	  rules	  and	  sometimes	  seeking	  official	  recognition.	  Through	  petitions	  to	  the	  Qing	  government,	  rules	  formed	  by	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  attained	  legal	  authority.	  Qing	  officials	  oversaw	  the	  enforcement	  of	  those	  rules	  in	  the	  way	  they	  enforced	  the	  state	  laws.	  The	  religious	  publics	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  Guangzhou,	  for	  example,	  were	  managed	  in	  a	  way	  not	  so	  different	  from	  how	  Han	  Chinese	  in	  Guangzhou	  managed	  their	  auto-­‐organizations.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  and	  Han	  Chinese	  in	  Guangzhou	  shared	  a	  common	  public	  culture.	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In	  many	  circumstances,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  did	  not	  view	  religious	  distinctiveness	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  their	  identity.	  Even	  when	  participating	  in	  and	  dealing	  with	  internal	  affairs	  of	  their	  religious	  publics,	  Chinese	  Muslims	  might	  adopt	  non-­‐religious	  identities	  such	  as	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  and	  law-­‐abiding	  Qing	  subjects,	  when	  expedient.	  For	  example,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  not	  only	  Muslims	  but	  also	  degree	  holders	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  examination.	  They	  were	  comfortable	  with	  their	  overlapping	  identities	  as	  both	  Muslims	  and	  members	  of	  the	  local	  gentry	  and	  generally	  happy	  to	  be	  managers	  of	  local	  mosques.	  Indeed,	  their	  authority	  and	  influence	  in	  local	  areas	  came	  from	  their	  status	  as	  members	  of	  the	  gentry.	  Like	  the	  case	  of	  Han	  Chinese,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  gentry	  were	  often	  the	  actual	  managers	  of	  local	  publics	  on	  whom	  officials	  relied	  to	  deal	  with	  local	  affairs	  and	  maintain	  local	  order.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that,	  when	  attending	  to	  local	  disputes,	  they	  adopted	  their	  identity	  as	  members	  of	  the	  gentry	  and	  worked	  with	  local	  governments,	  just	  like	  Han	  Chinese	  gentry.	  It	  suggests	  that	  Chinese	  Muslims	  did	  not	  really	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  being	  a	  Muslim	  or	  a	  Chinese,	  for	  an	  identity	  like	  membership	  of	  the	  gentry	  did	  not	  belong	  exclusively	  to	  Han	  Chinese,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  tension	  between	  being	  a	  Muslim	  and	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  gentry.	  Chinese	  Muslims	  had	  multiple	  identities	  and	  were	  involved	  in	  overlapping	  publics.	  They	  consciously	  adopted	  certain	  identities	  when	  participating	  in	  or	  forming	  various	  publics.	  	  
Like	  all	  other	  publics,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  publics	  were	  also	  often	  formed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  cooperation	  and	  to	  serve	  common	  economic	  interests.	  Different	  bonds	  were	  invoked	  consciously	  for	  certain	  purposes.	  For	  example,	  Chinese	  Muslim	  merchant	  associations	  were	  often	  exclusive	  of	  other	  Chinese	  Muslims.	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Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  one	  region	  were	  not	  necessarily	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  privileges	  or	  property	  with	  Chinese	  Muslims	  of	  another	  region	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  common	  religious	  identity.	  Therefore,	  various	  factors	  could	  make	  Chinese	  Muslims	  leave	  aside	  their	  common	  religious	  bond.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  economic	  interests	  could	  also	  drive	  Chinese	  Muslims	  with	  long-­‐term	  severe	  conflicts	  to	  invoke	  their	  common	  religious	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  cooperate.	  
This	  thesis	  is	  a	  preliminary	  study	  on	  the	  public	  culture,	  identities,	  and	  law	  of	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  Currently,	  steles	  and	  other	  historical	  records	  that	  have	  been	  found	  pertaining	  to	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  remote	  and	  rural	  areas	  as	  well	  as	  those	  regions	  with	  a	  very	  small	  minority	  of	  Chinese	  Muslim	  residents	  are	  much	  fewer	  than	  those	  pertaining	  to	  Chinese	  Muslims	  in	  big	  cities.	  Materials	  from	  the	  18th	  century	  are	  also	  less	  abundant	  than	  those	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Further	  search	  for	  primary	  sources	  is	  needed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  if	  there	  were	  any	  publics	  in	  which	  both	  Chinese	  Muslims	  and	  Han	  Chinese	  participated	  together.	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